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ABSTRACT 
  
  Previous research has suggested that there are multiple psychological processes 
underlying delusional thought. While it appears that cognitive biases in certain reasoning 
and attention processes are related to delusion-proneness, the influence of emotion on 
these processes is not well understood. The overall objective of this study was to 
investigate the effect of emotional content on performance on tasks thought to measure 
attentional bias, preferential recall, and probabilistic reasoning in individuals with 
schizophrenia and demographically matched controls. In order to account for level of 
delusion-proneness, participants also completed a multidimensional measure of 
delusional thought. It was hypothesized that individuals with schizophrenia would 
perform more poorly on both the emotional and neutral versions of these tasks compared 
to controls. It was also hypothesized that within each group, there would be a statistically 
significant emotion effect, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional 
(compared to neutral) condition of each task. This emotion effect was expected to be 
larger in the schizophrenia group. Finally, it was hypothesized that the emotion effect 
would increase as the severity of delusional proneness increased for all participants, 
regardless of group. As hypothesized, the schizophrenia group performed more poorly on 
the tasks overall, though expected emotion effects were generally absent. There were no 
differences in the size of emotion effects between the groups on any of the cognitive 
tasks administered, and the emotion effect did not appear to increase as severity of 
delusion-proneness increased. Factors that may have contributed to this pattern of results 
are discussed. Implications of these findings on theoretical models of delusions and 
future directions for research in this area are also discussed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “I am dead;” “aliens control my thoughts;” “the government has inserted a 
microchip inside my brain.” These are all beliefs expressed by individuals experiencing 
various types of delusions, representing the "Cotard" delusion, delusions of alien control, 
and paranoid delusions, respectively (Coltheart, 2007; Ellett, Freeman, & Garety, 2007). 
Delusions, broadly defined as fixed false beliefs, are prevalent among individuals with 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. More than 90% of schizophrenia patients 
experience delusions at some point during the course of their illness (Cutting, 1995). 
Additionally, delusions are often present in individuals with schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders. While the study of delusions in individuals with schizophrenia and related 
disorders has received the most attention in the research literature to date, the impact of 
delusions is certainly not limited to that population. Delusions may also be part of the 
symptom profile of individuals with mood disorders (e.g., bipolar disorder and major 
depressive disorder with psychotic features), Alzheimer’s disease, and traumatic brain 
injury.  
 
Defining Delusions 
Though the study of delusions has spanned almost two centuries, many issues are 
still debated in the literature, including the precise definition of a delusion. The word 
‘delusion’ has Latin roots, coming from the verb ludere, which means “to play.” This 
particular conception of delusions refers to the observation that delusions are in many 
ways akin to ‘tricks’ being played on the mind (Butcher, Mineka, and Hooley, 2007). 
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When it first entered the medical literature in the early 19th century, the term ‘delusion’ 
was synonymous with the more general term “madness,” and at that time referred to a 
general deprivation of sense or lack of brightness (Hoff, 2006). The contemporary use of 
the term can be traced to the work of Karl Jaspers, who is commonly credited as being 
the first to formally define the concept of delusions in his book General Psychopathology 
(Jaspers, 1913/1997). His definition would serve as the basis of the formal definition of 
delusions according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (DSM-IV-TR). According to the DSM-IV-TR, a delusion is a “false belief based 
on incorrect inference about external reality and firmly sustained in spite of what almost 
everybody else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof 
or evidence to the contrary.” Additionally, criteria entail that the belief must not be 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the belief holder’s culture or subculture 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
While this particular definition has its share of critics (e.g., Bell, Halligan, & 
Ellis, 2006; Heinimaa, 2002; Leeser & O'Donohue, 1999; Spitzer, 1990), alternative 
conceptualizations have not approached the definition offered by the DSM-IV-TR in 
terms of their acceptance or use in the field of psychiatry or psychology. Nonetheless, 
many of these criticisms warrant consideration. For example, Bell and colleagues make 
two important points regarding the definition found in the DSM-IV-TR. First, they point 
out that delusions might not necessarily be false beliefs per se, citing that a delusional 
belief could be a value judgment, a statement that is not amenable to hypothesis testing, 
or in fact turn out to be true. Secondly, they contend that the criterion that a delusion is 
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not ordinarily accepted by members of a culture or subculture is typically not based on 
empirical evidence of how widely accepted that belief may be (Bell et al., 2006).  
In their critique of the epistemological criteria inherent in the definition proposed 
by the DSM-IV-TR, Leeser and O’Donohue suggest that the primary defining feature of 
delusions is not that they represent “false beliefs,” but rather, that they are “uniquely 
unfalsifiable” beliefs (Leeser & O'Donohue, 1999). These authors posit that while the 
traditional definition of delusions (rooted in Jaspers’ conceptualization) labels delusional 
beliefs as those which are believed despite evidence to the contrary, many delusional 
beliefs lack any clear empirical content, and thus cannot be shown to be false using any 
empirical evidence. According to these authors, a belief may be unfalsifiable in principle, 
or because the belief-holder refuses to admit to potential falsifiers; either way they argue 
that this particular criterion is not suitable to define many beliefs that are in fact 
delusional.  
Recent attempts at defining delusions from interdisciplinary perspectives have 
taken a more integrative approach to this challenge, frequently drawing on definitions 
from various subfields such as psychology, psychiatry, and others. Some authors have 
opted to propose broader guidelines or criteria rather than narrow definitions. For 
example, based on common themes spanning several subfields, Gilleen and David 
proposed that a delusional belief is one that is held with great conviction, defies rational 
counter-argument, and is dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same socio-
cultural group (Gilleen & David, 2005). These authors take a twofold approach to the 
problem of defining delusions. While they acknowledge the difficulty in attempting to 
come the ‘perfect’ definition, they recognize the practical importance of commonly 
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agreed upon guidelines for the purposes of recognizing and studying clinical phenomena. 
These authors conclude by stating that “a more precise definition [of delusions] is 
probably impossible since delusions are contextually dependent, multiply determined, 
and multidimensional” (p. 5). Other researchers have gone beyond this view however, 
going so far as to state that “manuals of psychiatry or clinical psychology offer 
definitions of ‘delusion,’ but these turn out to be of little value for the scientific 
investigation of delusional belief” (Coltheart, 2007, p. 1043).  
 
The Debate Continues - Categorical versus Dimensional Approaches 
While the debate regarding the definition of a delusion seems far from coming to 
a close, another deliberation has been growing in the literature – the question of whether 
delusions ought to be viewed from a categorical versus a dimensional approach. This 
debate is not unique to the study of delusions or even psychosis; the same question has 
been raised in regard to symptoms of mood disorders (Akiskal & Benazzi, 2006), 
personality disorders (Trull, Tragesser, Solhan, & Schwartz-Mette, 2007), and other 
categories of psychiatric illness. The traditional approach that has been taken in these 
areas, including work on delusions, is the categorical approach. Within the literature on 
psychosis, this approach views the presence of delusions as a defining symptom of 
several psychotic disorders (e.g., schizophrenia). The absence of delusions, on the other 
hand, may preclude one from being diagnosed with certain disorders, such as delusional 
disorder. The pervasiveness of this view is evident not only in the DSM-IV-TR 
definition, but in many of the diagnostic tools typically used to diagnose and classify 
symptoms of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Recently though, there has been 
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a shift in the literature towards a more dimensional approach to characterizing delusions, 
as well as a number of other symptoms of psychosis. This approach, while not new, has 
received increasing attention in the past 10 to 20 years.  
According to the dimensional perspective, symptoms of psychosis lie on a 
continuum ranging from healthy, through eccentric, to floridly psychotic (Claridge, 
1994). In terms of delusions, this view states that they are not “all-or-nothing” false 
beliefs; instead delusional thought is present to some degree in both healthy and 
psychiatric individuals. Recent work that supports this theory includes that of Peters and 
colleagues, who measured delusional ideation in both a healthy population and a deluded 
population and reported that almost 10% of the healthy population scored above the mean 
of the deluded comparison group on a measure of delusion-proneness (Peters, Joseph, & 
Garety, 1999a). This indicates not only that delusional thinking is evident in a healthy 
community population, but that a small percentage of this group reported experiencing 
higher levels than those of the deluded group.  
 
Delusions from a Multidimensional Perspective 
Expanding on the idea that delusions lie on a continuum, it has been suggested 
that delusions themselves can be further broken down and conceptualized as 
multidimensional. This idea was originally proposed by Strauss based on research that he 
conducted on clinical inpatients with delusions. He proposed that there are three major 
dimensions of delusional belief: conviction of the belief; preoccupation with the belief; 
and distress related to the belief (Strauss, 1969). Since that time, a considerable amount 
of work has been done lending support to this notion (Hanssen, Krabbendam, Vollema, 
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Delespaul, & Van Os, 2006; Johns & van Os, 2001; van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 
2000; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Expanding upon the work of Strauss, it has been 
suggested that distinct dimensions of delusions may be better predictors of the presence 
of psychotic illness over others. Based on their work investigating delusion proneness in 
psychiatric individuals and non-psychiatric members of New Religious Movements, 
Peters and colleagues concluded that the dimensions of distress and preoccupation 
differentiated the two groups, while number of delusions endorsed and conviction of 
delusional beliefs did not (Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999b). A study by Lincoln 
reported similar findings: distress, as well as delusional content, best discriminated non-
clinical controls from schizophrenia patients (Lincoln, 2007). Both of these findings are 
in line with the dimensional perspective of psychosis, which contends that the experience 
of symptoms such as delusions is not inevitably associated with the presence of a 
disorder, rather, a myriad of other factors (e.g., pervasiveness of symptoms, frequency of 
symptoms, symptom comorbidity) ultimately play a major role in determining whether or 
not a given symptom is pathological (Johns & van Os, 2001). Along these lines, it has 
been suggested that delusional beliefs may actually exist on a continuum between typical 
worry, overvalued ideas, and delusions (O’Conner, 2009), and that what distinguishes 
‘normal’ and psychotic experiences may be an individual’s metacognitions (e.g., what the 
individual believes about a given belief). 
 
Cognitive Approaches to Understanding Delusions 
The influence of the continuum view of delusions is evident in the growing body 
of literature aimed at identifying the psychological mechanisms underlying individual 
 7 
symptoms of psychosis. According to the continuum hypothesis, studying a pathological 
symptom such as delusions in healthy individuals can enhance the understanding of 
delusional thought in psychiatric individuals. Cognitive approaches to delusions, on the 
other hand, have adopted the approach of studying the cognitive processes of healthy 
individuals in psychiatric individuals in order to better understand how malfunctioning in 
normal cognitive processes can lead to pathology.  
Cognitive neuropsychiatry, a major subfield in this area, seeks to gain a deeper 
understanding of the normal functioning of higher order aspects of cognition such as 
belief formation by studying people in whom such processes are abnormal (Coltheart, 
2007). According to Gilleen and David (2005), the aim of the cognitive neuropsychiatric 
approach to delusional beliefs is to “construct theories of the normal stages involved in 
belief-formation, and then show how malfunctions produce characteristic 
psychopathology” (p. 6). This view posits that the mechanisms that lead to delusional 
belief are not qualitatively different in individuals with clinical delusions; rather, the 
same cognitive, emotional, and neurological processes are at work in these individuals, 
they are simply operating in a disrupted or dysfunctional way, leading to the formation 
and maintenance of clinical delusions. Whether addressing delusions or other psychiatric 
symptoms, the cognitive neuropsychiatric approach focuses on symptoms rather than 
diagnoses, as it is thought that the study of symptoms is more likely to elucidate 
functional relationships as opposed to a broad diagnostic approach (Bell et al., 2006). 
Other cognitive approaches have adopted a similar dimensional view.   
As the name implies, most cognitive models of psychosis are anchored in some 
way by the primacy of cognitive processes in the formation and maintenance of psychotic 
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symptoms. A considerable amount of research has investigated the cognitive correlates of 
psychosis. Much of this work has been done with schizophrenia patients, and overall it 
appears that a diversity of cognitive impairments are pervasive and wide-ranging among 
these individuals (Heinrichs, 2005). However, recent work suggests that within this 
population, cognitive impairments may differ according to symptomatology. That is, 
individuals with primarily positive symptoms (delusions and hallucinations) may display 
different cognitive deficits than those with symptoms falling largely in the negative 
symptom cluster (Rocca et al., 2006). Coupled with work investigating delusions in other 
psychiatric disorders (e.g., delusional disorder), there is a growing body of literature 
focusing exclusively on uncovering the mechanisms responsible for the manifestation 
delusions. Though a full review of these theories is beyond the scope of this manuscript, 
it is worth noting several models that are particularly relevant to understanding the key 
cognitive processes underlying delusional thought.  
One theme that appears in multiple theories of delusional thought is the role of 
abnormal or anomalous experiences. According to Maher, dysfunction at the perceptual 
level results in anomalous experiences for delusional individuals, who proceed to apply 
normal processes of reasoning and rationality in order to explain these strange 
experiences (Maher, 2005). Maher states that deficits in reasoning are not central to 
distinguishing those with delusions and those without. However, others have argued for 
the primacy of reasoning deficits in delusions. For instance, Gerrans has suggested that it 
is the failure to apply normal rules of pragmatic reasoning or rationality (e.g., What 
counts as good evidence? How are initial probabilities assigned to competing 
hypotheses?) in the context of anomalous experiences that accounts for delusional 
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thinking (Gerrans, 2001). An important distinction between these two ideas is the relative 
importance assigned to lower-level processes of perception versus higher-order processes 
such as reasoning. Recently, Fletcher and Frith (2009) proposed a framework for 
understanding delusions based on a Bayesian approach of hierarchical prediction 
modeling in the brain. This model narrows the gap between lower and higher-order 
processes by accounting for how each process influences the other in a feedback loop that 
leads to delusional beliefs. These authors suggest that prediction errors (a mismatch 
between one’s expectations and one’s actual experiences), have influence at the lower 
perceptual level, leading to anomalous experiences. Higher level processes, such as 
reasoning, are then fed faulty input about these experiences, leading to faulty output (i.e., 
conclusions) that in turn exert influence on future prediction errors at the lower level 
(Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This theory predicts that in time, the constant readjustments that 
result from this feedback loop lead one beyond faulty conclusions about isolated 
instances and form the basis for more global delusional beliefs. 
While theories of delusions are becoming increasingly sophisticated, fundamental 
questions about the cognitive processes that play a central role in delusional thought 
remain unanswered. For example, despite the past 30 years worth of research on the 
subject, it does not appear that the basic question of whether individuals with delusions 
reason differently than those without (including both ‘normal’ controls and non-
delusional psychiatric patients) has been definitively answered (Mujica-Parodi et al., 
2000). This is not to suggest that considerable progress has not been made in the search 
of relevant processes to focus on. Bell et al. (2006) identified the following overarching 
areas of investigation as critical to the understanding of delusions: probabilistic 
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reasoning, attributional style, attention, and metacognition. Guided by these findings, and 
in light of the recent trend to focus on individual symptoms, the following review will 
focus on literature that specifically addressed the construct of delusions and/or 
distinguished participant groups based on delusional status.  
 
Cognitive Correlates of Delusional Thought 
Cognitive biases can be defined as impaired thought processes that occur as a 
result of one’s experiences and which lead one to notice, pay attention to, or recall some 
types of information better than others. This in turn may bias one’s interpretation of 
subjective experiences (Klewchuk, McCusker, Mulholland, & Shannon, 2007). Biased 
cognitive processes concerned with reasoning and attention have been the focus of much 
of the literature on the cognitive correlates of delusions. Broadly speaking, attention and 
delusional thought could theoretically be linked in numerous ways. For instance, it is 
possible that individuals with delusions selectively attend to information perceived as 
threatening or related in some way to a preexisting delusional belief, a theory that was 
first proposed by Ullmann and Krasner in 1969 (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood, 
& Kinderman, 2001). Reasoning processes have also been implicated as being directly 
involved in delusional thinking processes. Deficits in inductive and deductive ‘formal’ 
logical reasoning in delusional individuals appear to have been the focus of early studies 
in this area (Mujica-Parodi, Malaspina, & Sackeim, 2000). As this area has grown, 
interest in tasks thought to reflect ‘everyday’ reasoning ability, such as quickness of 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty, has increased.   
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Delusions and Reasoning Processes 
Reasoning can be defined as “a combination of cognitive processes that allows us 
to draw inferences from a given set of information and reach conclusions that are not 
explicitly available, providing new knowledge” (Canessa et al., 2005, p. 30). One of the 
first researchers to formalize a theory on reasoning processes in psychotic individuals 
was Von Domarus, who stated that individuals with schizophrenia reason in an organized 
fashion but follow different rules of logic, leading to faulty conclusions (Mujica-Parodi et 
al., 2000). Though his original study investigating deductive logic in schizophrenia 
patients was conducted in 1944 (Von Domarus, 1944), few published studies appeared in 
this field within the next 30 years or so. However, since the 1970’s, more studies have 
appeared which aim to investigate logic and/or reasoning abilities in psychotic 
individuals.  
Numerous studies have reported information processing biases related to 
reasoning in both individuals with delusions (Garety et al., 2005; Garety, Hemsley, & 
Wessely, 1991; Langdon, Ward, & Colthart, 2008; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Ross, 
Freeman, Dunn, & Garety, 2009; Van Dael et al., 2006) and those who are delusion-
prone (Broome et al., 2007; Colbert & Peters, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 
2006; Linney, Peters, & Ayton, 1998; White & Mansell, 2009). Often referred to as the 
‘jumping-to-conclusions’ (JTC) data gathering bias, this occurs when individuals utilize 
less information when coming to conclusions during reasoning tasks requiring judgment 
under uncertain conditions. Specifically, it is thought that individuals with delusions have 
a tendency to gather less evidence before making inferences, and it is this bias toward 
gathering less data that leads one to jump to conclusions while performing reasoning 
tasks (Garety & Freeman, 1999). In the literature, this has typically been demonstrated by 
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having participants perform a task which requires them to guess the probability that 
‘randomly’ drawn colored beads come from one jar of beads over the other, based on the 
ratio of colored beads in each jar. Inferring that beads are being drawn from one jar as 
opposed to the other on the basis of very little evidence (few beads in this case) is 
indicative of a JTC reasoning style.  
Since the first report of the JTC data gathering bias in individuals with delusions 
(Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988), a number of studies have investigated the stability, 
specificity, and influence of alternate task paradigms on this finding. In order to 
investigate specificity, Peters et al. administered reasoning tasks to a group of psychiatric 
patients and then divided this group in two ways: 1) based on whether or not they were 
deluded; and 2) based on whether or not they were diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
Deluded patients were found to exhibit a JTC data-gathering bias, but no differences were 
found when patients were grouped by diagnosis. These findings led to the conclusion that 
the JTC bias appeared to be specific to delusional status (Peters, Thornton, Siksou, 
Linney, & Maccabe, 2007). Adding support to this point, Corcoran and colleagues 
investigated the JTC task in individuals with paranoid delusions (PD) across several 
groups including: current psychotic disorder (schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and 
delusional disorder), current affective disorder (depression), and remitted psychotic 
disorder. These authors reported that all three groups demonstrated the JTC bias, 
regardless of diagnosis. They concluded that this particular cognitive tendency is a 
transdiagnosotic feature in individuals with PD (Corcoran et al., 2007).  
In order to determine whether the presence of the JTC bias represents an 
underlying deficit in reasoning ability related to information gathering, rather than a 
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generalized reasoning deficit, Peters et al. (2007) administered the JTC task and two of 
the classic Wason reasoning tasks to individuals in the above described study. The Wason 
selection task is thought to measure conditional reasoning (e.g. ‘if p then q’), while 
Wason’s 2-4-6 task measures confirmation bias, or a tendency to interpret new 
information in a way that confirms preconceptions. These authors reported that while 
there were no group differences on tasks of general reasoning ability, individuals in the 
delusion group performed more poorly on the JTC task. They concluded that reasoning 
deficits in the delusion group appeared to be specific to those measured by the JTC task, 
rather than representing a generalized deficit in reasoning across tasks (Peters et al., 
2007). The point has also been made that, although the relationship between the JTC bias 
and other well established cognitive impairments in schizophrenia (e.g., memory, 
executive functioning) is not yet fully understood, the JTC bias differs from those 
impairments because it appears to be specific to delusional thought (Ross et al., 2009). 
Stability of the JTC bias during periods of symptom remission has also been 
investigated. In a longitudinal study of the JTC bias in individuals with delusions, it has 
been reported that this bias is present at follow-up (these individuals did not undergo 
specific treatment for the JTC bias). The authors of this study concluded that the JTC bias 
is thus a stable factor associated with delusional thinking (Peters & Garety, 2006). In a 
study that investigated the effect of a training session to modify the JTC bias by 
enhancing reasoning strategies in individuals with delusions, it was reported that 
participants requested more information before reaching a decision on the JTC task 
subsequent to training compared to the no training group (Ross et al., 2009). These 
authors also reported a modest effect on metacognitions about one’s own delusional 
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thoughts in the training group compared to the no training group, though this difference 
was not statistically significant in their small sample. These authors concluded that a 
change in data gathering and reasoning techniques might mediate a change in delusional 
thinking, though they stressed that this conclusion was tentative (Ross et al., 2009).  
While there is now strong support for the existence of the JTC data-gathering bias 
in individuals with delusions compared to controls (Garety & Freeman, 1999), certain 
factors may influence the consistency and strength associated with this finding. For 
instance, it was reported that while individuals with delusional disorder did show a JTC 
reasoning style when compared to controls, when performing on a task that added 
consequences to their decisions, this difference disappeared (Fear & Healy, 1997). Other 
researchers have reported that increasing memory demands of the task results in larger 
differences between deluded individuals and controls (Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, 
McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006). Task difficulty may also influence performance on this 
task, as some studies have found that altering the ratio of beads from 85:15 to 60:40 
improves performance in individuals with delusions (presumably because participants 
become more cautious in their estimations), while others have failed to replicate this 
finding (Ziegler et al., 2008). 
One important factor that has only recently received attention in the literature is 
the emotional salience of the task. While the traditional JTC beads task is considered 
emotionally neutral, versions have been developed that introduce an emotional 
component to the task. These paradigms may ask participants to make judgments under 
uncertainty on tasks where they are read positive and negative statements, and must 
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decide which list (containing different ratios of positive and negative statements) these 
statements originated from (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997b). 
In what appears to be the first study to investigate this relationship, Dudley and 
colleagues (1997b) found support for the hypothesis that emotional salience impacts the 
JTC bias. These authors reported a reduction in the amount of evidence participants 
requested before coming to a conclusion while performing an emotional JTC task. 
However, this finding was not exclusive to their group with delusions; it was also evident 
in individuals with other psychiatric disorders, as well as controls. In a study by Warman 
and colleagues, three groups (individuals with delusions, delusion-prone individuals, and 
controls) were compared on their performance on two tasks: a neutral and a highly self-
referent (emotional) JTC task. The findings from this study indicated that those with 
clinical delusions gathered significantly less information than both comparison groups on 
both of the tasks. They also made less accurate decisions than both groups but were more 
confident in their decisions. On both of those measures, the delusion-prone group did not 
differ from the control group. However, both the deluded and delusion-prone groups 
reported higher self-confidence on the emotional task compared to their own performance 
on the neutral version of the same task (control participants did not differ by task), 
suggesting that high self-reference impacted information processing in these groups 
(Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & Haudenschield, 2007).  
An alternate method of investigating the impact of emotion on the JTC bias by 
inducing state anxiety has been reported in a small number of recent studies. It appears 
that two of these investigations included individuals with delusions. Ellett et al. (2007) 
exposed individuals with persecutory delusions to either an anxiety invoking situation 
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(exposure to a busy urban environment), or a mindfulness task designed to reduce 
anxiety. These authors reported that subsequent to exposure, participants in the anxiety 
inducing condition displayed a more pronounced JTC bias compared to the anxiety 
reducing condition. In a study investigating the JTC bias in individuals with delusions 
and healthy controls, anxiety was induced via a mental imagery paradigm. Results from 
this investigation indicated that there was no difference between the groups on the JTC 
task, however authors pointed out that the anxiety induction technique did not appear to 
be successful in the delusion group, and both groups displayed unusually high rates of the 
JTC bias (So, Freeman, & Garety, 2008).  
In a study investigating treatment for delusions with antipsychotic medication, the 
JTC task was administered pre- and post-treatment in order to explore whether task 
performance mediated or moderated changes in symptom levels between the testing 
periods. Both a neutral and emotional version of the task was administered to individuals 
with psychosis before and after treatment with antipsychotic medication. Results 
indicated that, post-treatment, participants required more information (considered an 
improvement) before making a decision on the emotional JTC task (but not the neutral 
version). It was also reported that baseline performance on the emotional JTC task helped 
predict which patients showed improvement in their positive symptoms post-treatment. 
These authors found that while JTC performance did not mediate the effects of treatment 
on symptomatology, it may have moderated that relationship (Menon, Mizrahi, & Kapur, 
2008).  
Research investigating other reasoning biases has further elucidated the nature of 
reasoning processes in individuals with delusions, therefore a brief review of this work 
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follows. Attributional reasoning refers to a tendency to attribute ambiguous events to an 
internal cause (oneself) versus some external cause, such as another person (Bentall et al., 
2001). The first study to investigate this bias in individuals with schizophrenia 
(specifically those with persecutory delusions) reported that these individuals tend to 
excessively attribute positive events to internal causes and negative events to external 
causes as compared to individuals with depression and normal control participants 
(Kaney & Bentall, 1989). The finding that individuals with persecutory delusions display 
this characteristic bias in attributional styles (often referred to as an exaggerated 
externalizing bias, or EB) has been replicated (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Bentall, Kaney, & 
Dewey, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Candido & Romney, 1990; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Kinderman, Prince, Waller, & Peters, 2003). Other 
researchers, however, have failed to find an EB in individuals with persecutory delusions 
(Martin & Penn, 2002; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2005), or in some cases have 
reported partial support for an abnormal attributional bias that is not specific to 
persecutory delusions (Humphreys & Barrowclough, 2006). Though the theory that 
attributional reasoning biases contribute to delusional thought has amassed considerable 
support, more work is clearly needed to determine whether this reasoning bias 
generalizes to all subtypes of delusional thought or is specific to persecutory delusions.  
Another area of interest in the literature on reasoning and delusions is the 
investigation of the relationship between delusions and deficits in processing evidence.  
The ability to correctly process confirmatory evidence to support a belief, coupled with 
the ability to integrate evidence that disconfirms an erroneous thought, appears to be 
important to the overall question of how normal beliefs are formed and maintained 
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(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). A deficit in the ability to 
integrate disconfirmatory evidence into previously held beliefs is known as a bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and it has been suggested that individuals with 
delusions routinely disregard evidence that disconfirms their delusional thought in order 
for delusional beliefs to be maintained (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & 
Bebbington, 2002).  The presence of a BADE has been reported in schizophrenia patients 
with delusions (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006), and individuals who are 
delusion-prone (Woodward, Buchy, Moritz, & Liotti, 2007). Addiitonally, it has been 
reported that a BADE does not appear to be due to more generalized reasoning or 
cognitive (e.g., attention) deficits (Moritz & Woodward, 2006; Woodward et al., 2006). 
Taken together, research investigating reasoning biases, including JTC, an exaggerated 
externalizing bias, and a BADE highlight the importance of understanding reasoning 
processes in individuals with delusions. 
 
Delusions and Attentional Bias 
 The study of general attention deficits in individuals with schizophrenia 
encompasses a vast amount of research spanning decades. Within the literature on 
delusions and other positive symptoms of psychosis (e.g., hallucinations), the study of 
attentional biases has become a focus only recently. Attentional bias has been 
investigated both as a primary process of interest, and as a lower level process 
contributing to higher level functions, such as reasoning (Barch & Carter, 1998). In a 
recent study evaluating performance on numerous neuropsychological domains 
(including attention, memory, perceptual-motor speed and other executive processes) in 
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individuals with schizophrenia, only the attentional deficit domain was correlated with 
positive symptoms (Rocca et al., 2006). However, it should be noted that these authors 
did not assess reasoning ability.  
In broad terms, attentional bias refers to a tendency to devote more or less 
attentional resources toward particular stimuli due to the relative importance of those 
stimuli. According to Yantis, stimuli that gets selected by the attentional system at any 
given moment is determined by 1) the properties of the scene; and 2) the expectations, 
beliefs, and goals of the observer (Yantis, 1996). Attentional bias may result from any 
number of deficits or differences in attention capacity, for example, increased time taken 
to disengage from a particular stimuli perceived as threatening is a type of attentional bias 
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001).  
Attentional bias has been widely studied in both mood (Leppanen, 2006) and 
anxiety disorders (Bishop, 2007). Recently however, it has been argued that the study of 
attentional biases is critical in individuals with schizophrenia based on the interactive 
effects of attentional biases coupled with other deficits common in psychotic individuals, 
such as a tendency to gather little information before reaching strong conclusions (Moritz 
& Laudan, 2007). According to these authors (2007), the combination of both scarce and 
affectively biased data selection of available information may distort inner 
representations, prompting the formation of false beliefs, thus contributing to delusion 
formation and maintenance. 
 In individuals with delusions, attentional biases may be present across numerous 
task modalities, including visual and auditory domains. Various task paradigms that have 
been used to measure these abilities include vigilance tasks (e.g., visual scanning of 
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faces), selective attention tasks (e.g., variants of the Stroop task), as well as 
attention/working memory tasks (e.g., word list tasks). Work in this area has attempted to 
analyze attentional differences both in individuals with clinical delusions and those 
identified as delusion-prone.  
In a several studies of individuals reporting high levels of delusion-proneness, 
biased attention toward angry and threatening faces has been reported  (Arguedas, Green, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006; Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003a; Green, Williams, & 
Davidson, 2001; Laroi, D'Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2006). Some of these studies 
also investigated recognition memory for affective faces as well. While Green and 
colleagues (2003a) reported impaired affect recognition of fear faces in delusion-prone 
individuals, Laroi et al. (2006) reported enhanced memory (indicative of an attentional 
bias) toward angry faces in their sample of delusion-prone individuals. Attentional bias 
toward threatening faces has also been investigated in individuals with delusions. In a 
study comparing deluded and non-deluded schizophrenia patients, it was reported that 
visual scanning patterns of deluded patients reflected an attentional bias away from 
salient features of faces signifying direct threat (anger), and more general avoidance of 
faces signifying indirect threat (fear) expressions (Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003b).  
Another paradigm for investigating visual attentive bias in individuals with 
delusions is the inhibition of return (IOR) paradigm developed by Mortiz and Laudan 
(2007). These authors had two groups of individuals with schizophrenia (divided by the 
presence or absence of paranoid delusions) complete a task requiring them to view cue 
pictures, some of which were paranoia-relevant, on either side of the computer screen. 
Following the picture display, individuals saw a target appear at the same or opposite 
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location, and had to indicate where the target was. Participants responded faster to targets 
following paranoia scenes, regardless of delusional status. These authors concluded that 
the attentional bias toward paranoia cues displayed by individuals with schizophrenia 
facilitated the processing of subsequent information processing (Moritz & Laudan, 2007).   
It has been suggested that if individuals with delusions show attentional biases 
toward particular (e.g. threat-related) stimuli, they might tend to preferentially recall this 
information as well (Bentall, Kaney, & Jones-Bowen, 1995). These authors tested this 
theory across three groups: individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with 
depression, and controls, all of whom performed a word recall task. Word lists contained 
threat-related, depression-related, and emotionally neutral words, which participants were 
instructed to recall immediately following presentation. These authors reported that 
patients with delusions recalled fewer words overall compared to normal participants, and 
showed a bias toward recall of threat words (a bias not displayed by the depressed group) 
and depression words (as did depressed patients). The delusion group also showed a 
unique tendency to repeat threat-related words during recall (Bentall et al., 1995). These 
results were somewhat consistent with a previous study that reported increased recall of 
threatening propositions from stories that contained threatening and non-threatening 
themes by deluded patients compared to control participants. However, in this study, 
there was no evidence that the deluded group had an abnormal tendency to recall 
threatening stories as a whole compared to non-threatening stories (Kaney, Wolfenden, 
Dewey, & Bentall, 1992).    
An alternative way to investigate attentional biases is by using tasks during which 
inhibition of automatic or prepotent attentional features is required for efficient task 
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performance. The emotional Stroop task is one such task. This task is regarded as the 
principle research tool for investigating attentional biases (Wells & Matthews, 1996). The 
emotional Stroop task is a variant of the more well-known classic Stroop paradigm, 
during which color words are presented in congruent (the color “red” in red ink) or 
incongruent (the color “red” in green ink) ink, and participants must name the ink color 
of the word. The phenomenon whereby it takes longer for healthy participants to name 
the ink color in the incongruent condition has been dubbed the “Stroop effect,” and is 
thought to be due to the cognitive interference created by suppressing one’s habitual 
response to read words in favor of the non-habitual response of naming the ink color 
(MacLeod, 1991).  
The original version of the Stroop task places demands on selective attention, as 
well as other executive functioning processes such as conflict response monitoring and 
response inhibition (Gruber, Rogowska, Holcomb, Soraci, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2002). The 
emotional Stroop task is based on the same general premise, and the administration of the 
two variants is practically identical. However, instead of color words, the emotional 
Stroop task utilizes emotionally salient words (e.g. positive or negatively valenced 
words) and neutral words in order to assess the extent to which emotional stimuli 
captures attentional resources (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The task is 
thought to measure selective attention to emotionally relevant stimuli by contrasting the 
extra time it takes to name the ink color during trials involving emotionally salient words 
compared to trials of neutral words (Thomas, Johnstone, & Gonsalvez, 2007). Notably 
different from the classic Stroop task, this task places less demands on conflict response 
monitoring, as it is more difficult to name the ink color of a conflicting color word 
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(classic task) as opposed to a word unrelated to color. Common to both paradigms, 
however, one must still suppress the habitual reading response.   
Emotional Stroop interference has been found across a wide range of different 
clinical conditions (Williams et al., 1996). In the first study utilizing this task paradigm 
with individuals with persecutory delusions, four ‘word’ lists were used: meaningless 
strings of “O’s, neutral words, negative words, and paranoia words. The authors of this 
study reported that individuals with paranoid delusions displayed increased reaction time 
(indicating increased interference) when processing paranoia words (Bentall & Kaney, 
1989). Similar results were reported in a subsequent study investigating emotional Stroop 
interference in individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with depression, and 
healthy controls. Individuals with paranoid delusions were found to take longer to color 
name words with either a positive or negative valence compared to controls (Kinderman, 
1994). In a study of individuals with delusional disorder, it was reported that participants 
demonstrated greater interference for threatening words compared to controls (Fear, 
Sharpy, & Healy, 1996b). Interestingly, these authors found that individuals within the 
delusion group with non-persecutory delusions also showed increased interference for 
other types of emotionally salient words (anxiety and sadness words) compared to 
controls.  
In a variation of this classic emotional Stroop paradigm, the emotional Stroop task 
was used as an experimental manipulation of attentional bias to different sources of threat 
in individuals with persecutory delusions, those with depression, and a healthy control 
group. All groups completed a measure of self-concept (containing 30 negative and 30 
positive words rating self-concept) before and after the Stroop task. Before the Stroop 
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task, there were no statistically significant differences on the self-concept measure 
between the groups, however, following administration of the emotional Stroop task, 
individuals in the deluded group showed a statistically significant discrepancy on self-
concept ratings (self-concept was rated more negatively) compared to the two other 
groups (Kinderman et al., 2003). These findings suggest that the activation of attentional 
biases present in individuals with persecutory delusions influences other reasoning 
biases.  
While there is a small body of research investigating emotional Stroop 
performance in individuals with persecutory delusions, there appears to be less work 
investigating individuals with other types of delusions. In a case study of an individual 
with delusional beliefs that she had died (Cotard delusion) and that members of her 
family had been replaced (Capgras delusion), it was reported that on an initial emotional 
Stroop task, she displayed an attentional bias toward words related to her delusional 
beliefs. Once those beliefs remitted, she no longer displayed any difference between 
neutral words and words relevant to her previously held delusional beliefs (Leafhead, 
1996). Based on this study, the emotional Stroop task appears to be similarly useful for 
investigating attentional bias in individuals with other subtypes of delusions beyond 
persecutory type.  
Taken together, the research on attention biases in delusion-prone and delusional 
individuals supports the theory of an attentional bias, particularly in the presence of 
stimuli that is salient in some way to these individuals. However, the pattern of such a 
bias (e.g. whether attention is directed toward or away from salient stimuli) is not clear, 
even in cases when tasks may be very similar (e.g. in tasks assessing attention toward 
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threatening faces). Furthermore, the impact of attentional bias in individuals with 
delusions remains unclear. On particular laboratory-based tasks, an attentional bias may 
be helpful, such as in the case of increased task efficiency following paranoia cues 
reported by Mortiz and Laudan (2007); conversely, an attentional bias toward threatening 
stimuli could impair performance when preferential attention to such stimuli is not 
relevant to the task at hand, such as during performance on an emotional Stroop task.   
 While attentional bias has become an important area of research into cognitive 
processes in individuals with delusions (Rossell, Shapleske, & David, 1998), there 
appears to be a relative paucity of work investigating attentional bias in individuals 
across a range of delusions. As evidenced from the above review, there is a growing body 
of work focusing on persecutory delusions and the construct of paranoia, which makes 
sense considering the prevalence of this subtype of delusional beliefs. However, the 
generalizability of these findings to other types of delusions is somewhat limited. 
Additionally, while there is a significant body of research investigating a wide range of 
attentional processes in individuals with schizophrenia, the application of these findings 
towards an understanding of the theoretical mechanisms underlying delusional thought is 
limited.  Despite these limitations, findings concerning attentional biases in individuals 
with delusions do point to a number of specific areas of inquiry for further research. One 
of these areas is the importance of emotion. Inherent to the study of attentional bias is the 
influence of the saliency of the material attended to (or ignored). It has been suggested 
that emotion and cognition appear to be necessary to both information processing and the 
implementation of resultant behaviors in those behaviors essential for attention (Wolfe & 
Bell, 2007).   
 26 
In reviewing the literature investigating the cognitive reasoning biases related to 
delusional beliefs, several trends are apparent. It has become increasingly accepted to 
investigate cognitive processes related to delusions both in clinical populations and in 
delusion-prone non-psychiatric individuals. Increased attention on specific cognitive 
processes such as reasoning and attention biases, as opposed to more generalized 
cognitive deficits, is also evident. Additionally, the role of other psychological processes 
is increasingly being recognized, especially the possible influence of affective processes 
as they relate to cognitive functions such as reasoning and attention.    
 
The Role of Emotion in Cognitive Models of Delusional Thought  
While cognitive dysfunction is clearly a cardinal feature of schizophrenia, and is 
evidently related to delusion-proneness as well, some researchers have argued that the 
role of emotional dysfunction in symptom formation and maintenance may be just as 
important (Aleman & Kahn, 2005). According to Garety and colleagues (2007), 
emotional processes appear to have a distinct role in the formation and maintenance of 
delusions, however, this role has received considerably less attention than that of the 
cognitive correlates. Their model, as well as other cognitive models of psychosis, has 
increasingly pointed to the importance of emotions as directly contributing to the 
development of delusions, the content and themes of delusions, and the treatment of 
delusions. While the line of research recognizing the potential contributory role of 
emotion in the delusional process is quite new, there are already competing models 
aiming to explain the mechanisms by which cognitive and emotional factors contribute to 
delusional thought.  
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The cognitive model of psychosis developed by Garety and colleagues is notable 
for stressing a multifactorial account of the formation and maintenance of delusions 
(Garety et al., 2001). The framework presented by these authors incorporates the 
cognitive, emotional, social, and neurobiological correlates of delusions, with an 
emphasis on understanding how these factors interact in a way that results in pathological 
delusional thought. Influenced by the dimensional approach to delusions, these authors 
propose that the presence of psychotic experiences does not independently predict 
transition to psychosis, instead, there are specific cognitive and emotional factors 
working in combination that encourage the emergence of a clinical disorder (Garety et 
al., 2007). In their recent review covering cognitive models of psychosis (which 
encompass both delusions and hallucinations), these authors present support for the 
following hypotheses: 1) symptoms of psychosis lie on a continuum of normal 
functioning; 2) cognitive reasoning biases contribute to the occurrence of delusions; 3) 
these biases may represent risk factors for the transition from subclinical to clinical 
symptoms; 4) emotional processes contribute to the occurrence and persistence of 
psychotic features; and 5) social adversity and trauma are associated with psychosis 
(Garety et al., 2007).   
Garety et al.’s model is primarily concerned with delusions commonly seen in 
individuals with psychotic disorders, including but not limited to persecutory delusions, 
grandiose delusions, delusions of reference, and other less common subtypes (e.g. 
jealousy delusions). These authors suggest that the most common route to positive 
symptoms such as delusions is through cognitive and affective changes that are triggered 
by external events. The interpretation of these events is influenced by disruptions in 
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cognitive processes of attention and reasoning, which are in turn influenced by emotional 
changes feeding back into the moment-by-moment processing of these experiences 
(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001). For example, imagine that an 
individual sees a car parked outside his house. If this individual displays a cognitive 
reasoning bias like the JTC bias, he may interpret this to mean that someone in the car is 
watching him. The emotional implications of this interpretation may include feelings of 
fear and anxiety. These affective processes then feed back into further cognitive 
appraisals about the situation, potentially leading the individual to additional conclusions, 
for example, he may think that the intent of the individual watching him is to harm him in 
some way. This simple example only addresses one reasoning bias that may be present 
and ignores the role of other important factors thought to contribute to delusions, 
however, numerous reasoning biases (e.g. externalizing attributional bias, 
disconfirmation bias) and other cognitive deficits (e.g. attention deficits) may be present 
in reality.  
In the model of delusions proposed by Garety and colleagues, these authors argue 
that emotion plays a direct role in the development of delusions via the influence of 
affective processes on cognitive appraisals. Alternatively, it has been suggested that 
delusions actually serve a defensive role against the experience of negative emotions. The 
defense model of delusions, as it is known, states that when there is the potential for 
negative self-beliefs to become activated, delusions defend against this by serving as an 
external source with which to attribute those negative appraisals (Bentall et al., 1991; 
Bentall et al., 1994). This model was developed primarily to account for persecutory 
delusions in paranoid individuals. Early conceptions of this model suggested that the 
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main cognitive reasoning process at the heart of this theory is attributional style. For 
example, if an individual loses her job there is the potential that she may attribute this 
event to negative characteristics about herself (an internal attribution). According to the 
defense model however, she may instead conclude that her boss is out to get her (an 
external attribution), thus defending against dealing with negative attributions directed at 
herself. Recently, the authors of this model conducted a large scale investigation of 
cognitive and emotional processes in individuals with paranoid delusions with the aim of 
distinguishing which variables best predicted delusions. These authors reported that 
paranoid delusions were associated with a combination of pessimistic thinking style, 
including pessimistic explanatory style and negative emotion, and impaired cognitive 
performance, including the JTC bias and impaired ability to reason about the mental 
states of others.  Interestingly, these authors also pointed out that emotion-related 
processes were more closely linked with paranoid delusions than cognitive performance 
in their investigation (Bentall et al., 2009). 
Although they present different mechanisms by which emotion influences 
delusions, both the direct and defense models address the importance of the role of affect 
on cognitive processes. These models also share considerable overlap in terms of the 
theoretical underpinning cited to support them, as well as other cognitive models not 
mentioned here. One influential theory that has shaped both models is the idea that 
psychotic and emotional disorders are not discrete clusters of disorders; rather, it has been 
argued that disorders of emotion and psychotic disorders actually share considerable 
overlap. According to Lake’s recent review of the area, this argument can be traced back 
to the work of Emil Kraepelin, who initially differentiated ‘dementia praecox’ (later 
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renamed schizophrenia) from ‘manic-depressive insanity’ (Lake, 2007). However, this 
sharp distinction, which is reflected in ‘gold standard’ diagnostic instruments, such as the 
DSM-IV-TR (2000), has been questioned by Lake and others (Craddock & Owen, 2005; 
Lake, 2007; Marneros, 2006). This question has been echoed in the body of literature that 
has focused on the relationship between emotional disturbance and the positive 
symptoms of psychosis, including delusions. It has been argued that a lack of empirical 
evidence to support a sharp distinction between these constructs, coupled with data 
supporting the relationship between emotion and positive symptoms of psychosis 
suggests that disorders of emotion and psychosis should no longer be theoretically 
separated (Freeman & Garety, 2003).  
Another theme that appears in the delusion literature that has influenced 
theoretical perspectives suggesting the importance of emotion in delusional thought 
processes is the finding that the content of delusions frequently reflects the content of an 
individual’s affective state (Freeman & Garety, 2003). For instance, persecutory 
delusions - which often contain themes of being followed or threatened - are thought to 
be linked to anxiety (Freeman, 2007). All of the major emotions, including anxiety, 
depression, anger, happiness, disgust, and jealousy, correspond to different subtypes of 
delusions. For instance, happiness is thought to relate to grandiose delusions, while 
depression is thought to relate to guilt delusions (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler, & 
Maguire, 2005; Freeman & Garety, 2003). Of course, there are subtypes of delusions 
(e.g. religious delusions) that do not correspond directly to any one emotion, which may 
indicate that not all cases of delusion relate directly to emotional concern (Freeman & 
Garety, 2003). Furthermore, while most delusions present in individuals experiencing 
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mood disorders with psychotic features are found to be mood-congruent (77.4%), a 
significant proportion of individuals report experiencing mood-incongruent or mixed 
delusions (Fennig, Bromet, Karant, Ram, & Jandorf, 1996). Thus, it appears that while all 
major emotions appear to be reflected in some delusion subtype, not all subtypes 
necessarily reflect emotions, at least not in a clear manner. Clearly, more work is needed 
to establish the role of emotion in delusion formation beyond the observed relationship 
between delusion content and affective state. 
Finally, recent work has investigated the relationship between emotional states 
and dimensions of delusions, although most of this work is too recent to have made a 
significant impact on cognitive models of delusions per se. Smith and colleagues 
examined the role of current levels of depression, self-esteem, and negative evaluative 
beliefs in relation to both delusion subtypes and dimensions of delusional belief. 
Subtypes of interest included both grandiose and persecutory delusions, and within each 
type, dimensions of pre-occupation, conviction, and distress were examined. These 
authors reported that individuals with higher levels of depression, lower self-esteem, and 
more negative evaluations reported persecutory delusions of greater severity and were 
more preoccupied and distressed by them. Additionally, it was reported that the severity 
of grandiose delusions was associated with higher self-esteem and inversely related to 
depression and negative evaluations about the self (Smith et al., 2006). This work 
provides further support for theoretical models suggesting a contributory role (i.e. 
emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient) of emotions in delusional thought (Freeman 
& Garety, 2003). Additionally, this work suggests that emotion may differentially 
influence discrete dimensions of delusional thought, namely severity, preoccupation, and 
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distress, though more research is needed in order to clarify this putative relationship. 
Taken together with theoretical models suggesting that the influence of emotion on 
delusional thought may depend on a number of factors, including delusion subtype, a 
multifaceted model of the relationship between emotions and delusions is emerging. 
However, this model will likely remain incomplete without taking into account how 
emotions may influence cognitive processes thought to contribute to delusion formation 
and maintenance, particularly attention and reasoning. 
 
Emotional Dysfunction in Schizophrenia and Delusions 
Certainly, the suggestion that dysfunctional emotional processes are present in 
psychotic individuals is not new. It has previously been established that emotional 
deficits are a core feature of schizophrenia. Three major deficit areas have been 
identified: emotional perception, emotional experience, and emotional expression 
(Aleman & Kahn, 2005). Within each of these domains, numerous deficits and 
differences have been reported, including impaired emotional facial recognition (Namiki 
et al., 2007) and deficits in emotional expression (Burbridge & Barch, 2007). In terms of 
psychotic symptoms such as delusions, the literature suggests that an increase in 
emotional experience coupled with a diminished ability in emotion perception is a 
common pattern in these individuals (Aleman & Kahn, 2005).  
While the body of literature investigating emotion processing in psychotic 
individuals is too extensive to cover here, many authors in this field have adopted the 
strategy of investigating the relationship of emotion processing deficits with other 
psychological processes of interest (e.g. Pinkham & Penn, 2006). For instance, these 
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authors have proposed the term ‘social cognition’ to encompass other aspects of 
cognition that are not typically assessed using traditional neurocognitive tasks but that are 
potentially important to emotional and social dysfunction seen in individuals with 
schizophrenia (Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003). Research on functional 
outcome in schizophrenia has also encouraged the trend to increase attention towards the 
influence of emotional processes, as it has been reported that emotion deficits may be 
better predictors of social dysfunction than cognitive deficits (Aleman & David, 2006). 
Though core symptoms of psychosis, such as cognitive and social dysfunction, 
are increasingly being related to deficits in emotional processing (Kuipers et al., 2006), 
many questions remain unanswered to date. For instance, the nature of the relationship 
between emotional deficits and other symptoms is still not clear. In regards to delusions, 
it has been pointed out by Garety et al. (2005) that “at present, it is an open question 
whether the contributions of reasoning and emotional processes to delusional severity are 
independent or act in combination (p. 374).”Also, questions of causality abound. More 
than half a century ago, Bleuler argued that in psychotic individuals, weakened reasoning 
processes allowed emotions to take hold of the individual, thus manifesting themselves in 
delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2003). Alternatively, it is possible that there is a core 
deficit that leads to impaired reasoning, dysfunctional emotional responses, and other 
cognitive and emotional deficits associated with psychosis.  
If there are multiple pathways to delusional thought, as suggested by a number of 
researchers, it is critical not only to identify each pathway, but to understand how these 
pathways interact. The confluence of cognition and emotion may arguably be the most 
important pathway leading to delusional formation and maintenance. It has been 
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previously suggested (in relation to the study of psychotic symptoms) that “emotion and 
cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by 
separate but interacting brain systems” (Aleman & Kahn, 2005, p. 284). According to this 
perspective, understanding the role of just one aspect is not just missing half the picture, 
it is more like trying to solve a puzzle without all of the pieces.   
 Understanding the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusions has important 
implications for the treatment for individuals with schizophrenia and other disorders 
characterized by delusions. Though antipsychotic medication is currently considered a 
first-line treatment for symptoms of psychosis, researchers have suggested that cognitive 
behavioral therapy (CBT) may be an important treatment component to be used in 
conjunction with medication (van der Gaag, 2006). These authors point out that while 
antipsychotic medications clearly improve positive symptoms such as delusions, 
delusions do not seem to be eliminated by medication alone. One influential theory in this 
area suggests that antipsychotic medications, specifically dopamine antagonists, “dampen 
the salience” of abnormal experiences, but do not necessarily target other dimensions of 
delusional thought that serve to maintain delusional beliefs. In other words, it has been 
proposed that antipsychotic medication does not fundamentally change thoughts or ideas; 
instead, these ideas lose their significance, thus dimensions such as the preoccupation and 
distress associated with the beliefs are diminished, while conviction may remain 
relatively unchanged (Kapur, 2003). CBT, on the other hand, has shown promise for 
improving (by lowering) conviction in individuals with delusions. Past research has 
reported that CBT may be effective at reducing delusional conviction in approximately 
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50% of treated cases (Garety et al., 1997; Jakes, Rhodes, & Turner, 1999; Tarrier et al., 
1998). 
Work investigating the relationship between psychological processes and 
dimensions of delusions has found evidence that cognitive and emotional processes may 
both relate to dimensions of delusions. For instance, one study reported that belief 
flexibility (a cognitive process) and levels of anxiety (emotion) both contributed to 
overall delusion conviction (Garety et al., 2005). While efforts to modify and enhance 
CBT to better target the rather unique set of psychological processes contributing to 
delusions is already underway, more work is needed in this area. Specifically, more work 
aimed at elucidating how the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusional thought 
interact is critical in order to clarify the potential pathways to changing these thoughts in 
therapy.  
Other research has focused on understanding dimensions of delusions because of 
potential power for predicting long-term outcome in individuals with schizophrenia. A 
recent study reported that poor (compared to good) outcome patients had delusions that 
were characterized by greater conviction, extension, disorganization, bizzareness, and 
pressure (Opjordsmoen & Retterstol, 2007). Although these authors suggested that 
dimensions of delusional thought may have predictive power for long-term outcome, they 
cautioned that this finding required replication. While much of the research in this area is 
preliminary, two important points have emerged. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that it is critical to understand the cognitive and emotional correlates of delusional 
thought because of the potential value of dimensions of delusions in predicting treatment 
outcome. Secondly, it appears that CBT, which was once not thought of as a viable 
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treatment for psychotic disorders, is now being recognized for its potential value in 
treating symptoms such as delusions (Zimmermann, Favrod, Trieu, & Pomini, 2005).   
    
Current Aims and Hypotheses 
Previous research has established that numerous cognitive and emotional factors 
appear to contribute to delusions. The theory that these factors may somehow exert their 
impact in combination to form and maintain delusional thought is also gaining 
acceptance. Though a handful of recent studies have begun investigating this link, this 
line of research appears to be in its infancy. More work is needed which aims to clarify 
the nature of the relationship among cognitive processes, emotions, and delusions.   
The current study sought to investigate how emotional content influences 
cognitive biases that have previously been shown to be present in individuals with 
delusions. Three tasks assessing reasoning and attention biases were selected based on 
the available literature in each respective area. In order to address the influence of 
emotion processing on task performance, emotionally salient stimuli were incorporated 
into these cognitive tasks, creating two conditions (emotional and neutral) of each task. 
This method allowed for task performance to be explored using both raw values of 
selected indices of performance (e.g., reaction time in the emotional Stroop task) and an 
additional measure of the ‘emotion effect.’ This term refers to the discrepancy between 
performance in the emotional and neutral condition in matched set of tasks. Though each 
task possessed a different metric of general performance, for instance, total number of 
words recalled on the word recall task versus number of trials to decision on the jumping 
 37 
to conclusions task, the emotion effect consistently refers to the difference between the 
emotional and neutral conditions of each respective set of tasks.  
While there are various methods of investigating the influence of emotion on 
cognitive performance, including measuring pre-existing emotional state, or by inducing 
mood states unrelated to task stimuli, the current study manipulated the emotional 
salience of the actual task itself. It was thought that this approach would most accurately 
address the main research question of interest, that is, how are cognitive reasoning and 
attention processes influenced by the concurrent processing of emotional salience specific 
to the task or problem at hand, and does this relationship differ in individuals with 
delusions? In order to address the latter portion of that question, two groups were be 
investigated – individuals with a current diagnosis of schizophrenia and community 
controls.  
In reviewing the literature on delusions and psychosis, it is apparent that delusions 
are most commonly studied among individuals with schizophrenia. Much of the past 
work investigating the psychological factors of delusions have lumped individuals with 
delusions together with those who do not have delusions. This method could potentially 
mask differences that exist between the two groups. While the traditional technique of 
administering a battery of neurocognitive tasks to a heterogeneous group of individuals 
with schizophrenia has contributed greatly to our understanding of the disorder 
(Heinrichs, 2005), there are some drawbacks to using this technique to address certain 
questions. One potential problem is that the heterogeneity of symptoms commonly 
observed in schizophrenia samples may introduce unintended variance when analyzing 
performance on cognitive and/or emotional processing tasks. Some authors have 
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suggested that future research investigating the cognitive and emotional interactions 
underlying single symptoms of the disorder is needed in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of schizophrenia (Aleman & David, 2006). To that end, the current study 
administered a multidimensional measure of delusional thought in order to account for 
dimensionality of delusion-proneness in our analysis of the data.  
By administering an emotional and neutral version of each task, in addition to the 
multidimensional delusion measure, two indices of task performance could be compared 
among the two groups as well as across the continuum of delusion-proneness. Consistent 
with an overall cognitive deficit as suggested in the literature, it was hypothesized that 
individuals with schizophrenia would perform more poorly on both the emotional and 
neutral versions of these tasks, as compared to performance of controls. It was further 
hypothesized that within each group, there would be a statistically significant emotion 
effect, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional (compared to neutral) 
version of each task. In addition, it was hypothesized that this predicted emotion effect 
would be larger in the schizophrenia group compared to the control group. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of delusional 
proneness increased for all participants, regardless of group.  
In addition to these hypotheses, exploratory analyses were also conducted in order 
to examine the effects of other task components not directly addressed in our primary 
hypotheses. Tasks were analyzed with respect to stimulus valence (positive or negative) 
to examine whether participant’s performance was differentially affected by emotion 
type. Additional analyses were also conducted in order to examine the effect of the 
dimensions of delusion preoccupation, conviction, and distress on performance. 
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METHODS 
 
Participants 
Power Analysis 
 In order to obtain an estimate of optimal sample size, a power analysis was 
conducted prior to data collection. A small number of previous studies investigating 
reasoning biases in deluded individuals with schizophrenia compared to non-psychiatric 
controls using the same JTC task variants as the proposed study were identified (Dudley, 
John, Young, & Over, 1997a; Dudley et al., 1997b; Menon et al., 2006). Effect sizes 
reported in these studies ranged between small (Cohen’s d = 0.34) and large (Cohen’s d = 
1.43), based on Cohen’s guidelines (J. Cohen, 1988). The average combined effect size 
from these studies (Cohen’s d = 0.88) falls in the large range. Few studies have 
investigated emotional Stroop performance specifically in individuals with delusions 
compared to controls. In one study that administered an emotional Stroop task (including 
neutral, positive, and negative words) to schizophrenia patients with persecutory 
delusions and healthy controls, a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.72) was calculated 
using Stroop interference scores (time to complete emotional word trials minus time to 
complete neutral trials; Kinderman, 1994). Finally, in a previous study investigating 
attentional bias using a word recall task in individuals with delusions (persecutory) 
compared to healthy controls (Bentall et al., 1995), the effect size for the difference 
between recall of emotion (threat or depression-related) and non-emotional words was 
calculated and fell in the large range (Cohen’s d = 0.88). An overall effect size was then 
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obtained by averaging the three effect sizes from previous studies investigating reasoning 
and attentional bias using emotional and neutral task conditions in individuals with 
delusions compared to healthy controls (Cohen’s d = 0.83).     
Based on the above studies and Cohen’s (1992) recommendations, a power 
analysis was conducted using G*Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007), with an alpha of .05 (two-tailed), and an estimated effect size of 0.83, in order to 
estimate the sample size needed to achieve a power level of .80. This procedure yielded 
an estimated total sample size (both groups combined) of 48. Based on this estimation, 25 
individuals with schizophrenia and 25 control participants were recruited in order to 
allow for sufficient power to determine group differences and examine relationships 
between performance on emotional versus neutral cognitive task conditions in each 
group. 
 
Recruitment 
Participants for this study included 25 individuals (outpatients) with 
schizophrenia and 25 demographically-matched control participants without a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. Individuals with schizophrenia were recruited from area mental health 
facilities, psychiatric units at local hospitals, psychiatrists in private practice, and through 
newspaper advertisements. Flyers were also posted in local area establishments (e.g., 
grocery stores). Demographically-matched control participants were recruited from the 
local community using flyers, newspaper advertisements, and online advertisements. All 
materials used to recruit participants for this study included a statement that participants 
completing the study would be monetarily compensated.  
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Initial Exclusionary Criteria 
 The age range of participants for this study was restricted to adults between the 
ages of 18 and 60. The upper age cutoff was set at age 60 in an attempt to avoid potential 
confounds due to age-related declines in cognitive performance seen in the general 
population (Keefover, 1998). Additional demographic factors that were considered 
during recruitment included gender, race, and education level, due to the need to recruit 
control participants who were demographically well matched to the schizophrenia group. 
A brief phone screen was conducted to determine eligibility (see Procedures below).  
 
Demographic Characteristics 
 The schizophrenia and control groups were well matched on most demographic 
variables (see Table 1). There was no difference in the gender composition between the 
groups, as each group consisted of 16 male and 9 female participants (χ2 (1) = 0, p > 
0.99). The mean age of participants was 39.61 (SD = 11.92) in the schizophrenia group 
and 39.57 (SD = 11.13) in the control group. There were no statistically significant 
differences between the groups with respect to age (F (48) = 0.0002, p = 0.99), or race (χ2 
(3) = 1.33, p = 0.86). Individuals in the schizophrenia group endorsed membership in the 
following racial categories: Caucasian (n = 14), African-American (n = 7), Hispanic (n = 
1), Asian (n = 1), and Mixed/Biracial (n = 2); individuals in the control group endorsed: 
Caucasian (n = 14), African-American (n = 7), Hispanic (n = 2), and Mixed/Biracial (n = 
2).  
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      There was no statistically significant difference in estimated premorbid 
intelligence (t (48) = 1.41, p = 0.17) between the schizophrenia (M = 97.92, SD = 10.30) 
and control (M = 101.84, SD = 9.42) groups. The two groups differed, however, on years 
of education. Participants in the control group had significantly more years of education 
(M = 14.20, SD = 1.89) compared to the schizophrenia sample (M = 12.16, SD = 1.77; t 
(48) = 3.93, p < .001). Given that it is common for individuals with schizophrenia to 
achieve lower than expected educational attainment, parental educational level was also 
examined. There was no statistically significant difference between the groups on this 
measure (Hotelling’s T2 = 0.19, F (2, 37) = 0.09, p = 0.92). 
 
Procedures 
Phone Screen 
Individuals responding to advertisements, flyers, and referrals from mental health 
professionals to participate in the study participated in a brief phone screening in order to 
assess eligibility for participation. Prior to answering any questions, all participants 
provided verbal consent to participate in the phone screen, with the understanding that 
they were free to discontinue participation at any point. Participants were then asked to 
provide basic demographic information including age, race, gender. Next, participants 
were read a list of past experiences, diagnoses, and other health factors that would 
prevent them from participating in the study. In order to protect their confidentiality, they 
were only required to answer “yes” or “no” after a series of statements, rather than 
indicate exactly which statement applied to them. Individuals in both the schizophrenia 
and control groups were excluded if they indicated that they: had undergone 
electroconvulsive therapy in the past 6 months; met diagnostic criteria for alcohol or 
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substance abuse in past month according to the DSM-IV-TR, or met criteria for DSM-IV-
TR alcohol or substance dependence not in remission for the past 6 months; had a history 
of hospitalization for substance dependence (e.g., detox); experienced significant vision 
problems; had significant hearing problems; experienced significant problems with the 
use of their dominant arm; did not speak English as their first language; had a history of 
significant head injury; had a history of neurological illness (including stroke, seizures, 
brain tumor, and Parkinson’s disease); or had a history of certain systematic medical 
diseases that may affect neurocognitive function (including AIDS, lupus, congestive heart 
disease, insulin-dependent diabetes). Individuals who did not fall between the ages of 18 
and 60 were not eligible to participate. Additionally, control participants were excluded if 
they reported any first-degree relatives with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or a 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Finally, individuals with schizophrenia who were not 
undergoing current treatment with antipsychotic medication were excluded. This was 
done in an effort to reduce the influence of untreated illness related symptoms (e.g. 
hallucinations), particularly on cognitive performance. 
  
Laboratory Procedures 
 Individuals who completed the laboratory-based portion of the study participated 
in a psychological interview, completed self-report measures, and underwent a series of 
cognitive tests, all of which were administered or directly supervised by a graduate 
student in clinical psychology. All participants completed informed consent procedures 
prior to engaging in any of the above mentioned tasks. Visual acuity was then measured 
using a standard Snellen wall chart. No participant demonstrated visual acuity less than 
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20/50; therefore no participant was excluded from the study based on inadequate visual 
acuity. All participants were administered and found to score in the normal range or 
above on Ishihara’s test for color blindness. Participants completed a brief measure 
assessing premorbid intellectual functioning, and all participants met cutoff criteria for 
study inclusion on this measure as well (estimated premorbid intelligence > 70).  
Participants in both study groups underwent a brief demographic interview 
followed by a formal diagnostic interview. In the schizophrenia group, all participants 
met diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, and no participant met diagnostic criteria for 
current co-morbid substance dependence. Participants in this group were not excluded if 
they reported co-morbid mood or anxiety disorders. All participants in this group 
reported current treatment with antipsychotic medication, 22 of whom were taking 
atypical antipsychotic medication, one of whom was taking typical antipsychotic 
medication, and two of whom were taking both typical and atypical antipsychotic 
medications. No participant in the schizophrenia group reported taking narcotic pain 
medication. Participants in the control group were excluded if they met diagnostic criteria 
for substance dependence (current), a psychotic disorder, or a mood disorder with 
psychotic features. This resulted in the discontinuation and exclusion of one participant. 
No individual in the control group reported current use of antipsychotic medication or 
narcotic pain medication. Individuals in either group reporting the use of prescription 
antidepressants or anxiolytics were not excluded. All participants were screened to ensure 
that no participant had used any psychotropic substance (except for the proper use of 
prescription medication) over the 48 hours prior to testing. Following the interview, 
individuals with schizophrenia were administered an additional semi-structured clinical 
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interview which assessed the presence and severity of positive and negative 
schizophrenia symptoms. All participants then completed a self-report measure of 
delusional thought. These measures are described in depth below.  
 The cognitive portion of the study included the administration of three cognitive 
tasks, each of which contained two conditions – a non-emotional (neutral) and an 
emotional condition. The jumping to conclusions and Stroop tasks were counterbalanced 
so that the starting condition was chosen at random to avoid potential confounds due to 
practice effects. While it was not possible to counterbalance the starting condition of the 
word recall task (the two conditions are intermixed within the same administration 
block), the order of emotional and neutral stimuli were randomized for each participant. 
The tasks consisted of: a jumping to conclusions (JTC) probabilistic reasoning task, an 
emotional Stroop task; and a word list recall task. These tasks are described in detail 
below. The cognitive tasks were embedded in a longer battery of tasks as part of a larger 
study. The average session lasted between 2.5 and 5 hours. Upon completion, all 
participants received payment (at the rate of $8 per half hour), as well as a debriefing 
statement. 
 
Measures 
Interview and Psychological Assessment 
Informed Consent  
All participants were required to provide written consent before participating in 
the study. Before signatures of both the participant and witness (the individual 
administering the study protocol) were obtained, consent was explained verbally and 
participants were given the opportunity to read the consent form and ask any questions. 
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They were also provided with a copy for their records. These forms, which contained 
identifying information, were stored in a secure filing cabinet separate from the study 
data, which was coded numerically to protect the identification of the participants. 
 
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV  
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (SCID-I; First, Gibbon, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 1997b) is a semi-structured clinical interview used to assess whether 
an individual meets diagnostic criteria for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders. This measure 
was used to confirm a diagnosis of schizophrenia in the schizophrenia group. It was also 
used to assess other Axis I disorders present in participants from both groups.   
 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV Axis II Personality Disorders 
The Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders 
(SCID-II) is a semi-structured clinical interview used to assess whether an individual 
meets diagnostic criteria for an Axis II Personality Disorder (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, 
Williams, & Benjamin, 1997a). The current study included selected sections from this 
measure used to screen for the presence of avoidant, paranoid, and schizotypal 
personality disorders. Previous research has suggested that these disorders may be 
genetically linked to schizophrenia (Fogelson et al., 2007; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Items on the SCID-II are scored on a 3-point scale (absent/false = 1, 
subthreshold = 2, threshold/true = 3). In order to determine the presence of a categorical 
diagnosis based on criteria outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), the number of  individual items with a rating of “3” in each 
subcategory is summed.  
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Structured Clinical Interview for Positive and Negative Symptom Scales 
The PANSS (Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1992; Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987) is a 
30-item rating scale that assesses positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. This 
measure includes an optional semi-structured interview (Structured Clinical Interview for 
Positive and Negative Symptom Scales; SCI-PANSS) developed to be used with the 
PANSS. The SCI-PANSS contains four subscales: Positive symptoms, Negative 
symptoms, General Psychopathology, and a Composite scale (Kay et al., 1992). Each 
symptom or dimension assessed has distinct criteria which is used to rate severity on a 
seven-point Likert scale. The interview is typically conducted in three stages that include 
a rapport building stage, a formal semi-structured interview, and a subsequent scoring 
stage. Each of the 30 items of the SCI-PANSS is rated on a seven point scale with each 
point representing increased levels of symptom severity (1 = Absent, 2 = Minimal, 3 = 
Mild, 4 = Moderate, 5 = Moderate/Severe, 6 = Severe, 7 = Extreme). Symptoms assessed 
by the SCI-PANSS are well defined in the accompanying examiner’s manual and scoring 
instructions.   
According to reliability assessments of the SCI-PANSS, each individual item 
included in the measure correlates strongly with the appropriate scale total (Kay et al., 
1987). Alpha coefficients of single items ranged from .64 to .84, and no gains in alpha 
coefficients were made by eliminating SCI-PANSS items. Inter-rater reliability 
correlations ranged between .89 and .94 (Kay, Opler, & Lindenmayer, 1988; Von 
Knorring & Lindstrom, 1995). Assessments of validity have shown strong discriminate 
and convergent validity, criterion validity, predictive validity, and concurrent validity 
(Kay et al., 1992). Individuals administering the SCI-PANSS in the current study 
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underwent training on this instrument through web-based videos provided by The 
PANSS Institute, LLC. 
 
Reading Subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test – 3rd edition  
The Reading Subtest of the Wide Range Achievement Test, Third Edition 
(WRAT-3R; Wilkinson, 1993) is a list of 42 words presented in order of increasing 
difficulty. In order to reduce instances of phonemic decoding on this task, these words are 
irregular with respect to common rules of pronunciation. The WRAT-3R has been 
standardized with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd edition (WAIS-III). The 
WRAT-3R is scored by obtaining the sum of correctly pronounced words. From this 
value, a reading scaled score is obtained. This value corresponds to an estimate of verbal 
intelligence. Previous research has supported the use of the WRAT-3 Reading scaled 
score as an acceptable estimate of premorbid IQ (in this case, prior to the onset of 
schizophrenia), particularly in individuals from the lower range of IQ (Griffin, Mindt, 
Rankin, Ritchie, & Scott, 2002; Johnstone, Callahan, Kapila, & Bouman, 1996). 
 
The 40-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory 
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999a), which was 
originally based on The Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974), 
was designed to measure delusional ideation in a healthy population. Items were chosen 
specifically for the purposes of measuring attenuated psychotic symptoms and sampling a 
wide range of delusional beliefs (Peters et al., 1999a). The PDI is designed to capture the 
dichotomous positive or negative endorsement of each item, but also taps into the 
dimensionality of the delusional belief. A respondent initially chooses a “yes/no” 
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response to each question, for example, “Do you ever feel as though there is a conspiracy 
against you?”  If the respondent does endorse the item, he or she is then asked to rate the 
degree of distress, preoccupation, and conviction of the delusional thought on a five-point 
Likert scale (ranging from 0-5).   
 The PDI yes/no scores are obtained by adding up the number of “yes” items 
(assigned one point) and the number of “no” items (assigned 0 points), yielding a range 
of 0 to 40 points. Additionally, each dimension measured on the 5-point Likert scale can 
be scored, obtaining a range from 0 to 200 points. The grand total PDI score can be 
obtained by adding up the three dimension scores and the yes/no score, for a range from 0 
to 640 points.  
 Scores on the PDI were normally distributed in a healthy population sample (n = 
272; Peters et al., 1999a). No differences were found between males and females on 
yes/no scores, any of the dimensions, or on the total PDI score. Significant inverse 
relationships with age were found on yes/no scores, the distress and preoccupation 
subscales, as well as a trend between age and the conviction subscale. The PDI was found 
to have good internal consistency (0.88), and good test-retest reliability (0.82) was 
demonstrated in a subset of the sample who was asked to retake the measure six months 
to a year later. The measure was also found to have good convergent validity, sharing 
52% to 58% of common variance with the Delusions-Symptoms-State-Inventory (Foulds 
& Bedford, 1975); the Schizotypal Personality Scale (Claridge & Broks, 1984) and the 
Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Criterion validity was established 
by administering the PDI to a group of currently deluded, psychotic individuals (N = 20). 
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Ratings on the total number of items endorsed and on all scales of the PDI were 
statistically significantly higher in this group (Peters et al., 1999a). 
 
Cognitive Tasks 
Stroop Task  
A computerized Stroop task with two conditions - emotional and neutral - was 
administered. Participants were seated 18 inches away from a 22-inch CRT monitor 
(Iiyama Vision Master Pro 514) and PC computer. A chin/forehead rest was used in order 
to minimize head movement and ensure that each participant was within 8” of a 
microphone which was used to record the reaction time of the onset of the vocal 
response.  
Several variations of the emotional Stroop task exist. Emotion and non-emotion 
(neutral) words for the current study were selected from the Affective Norms for English 
Words (ANEW) word list (Bradley & Lang, 1998). The ANEW word list consists of 
several hundred English words that have been rated on dimensions such as emotional 
arousal and emotional valence. In order to maximize the potential to detect differences 
between conditions, an equal number of high arousal negative and positive words were 
used in the emotional condition. The non-emotional condition consisted of an equal 
number of neutral words. Words in both conditions were matched on word frequency and 
word length. Word matching and selection was achieved using an online program 
designed to be used in conjunction with the ANEW list (Siegle, 1994).  
Following procedures described by Compton et al., words were presented in two 
blocks (one emotional, one neutral), as previous research has demonstrated that 
emotional words become harder to ignore when they are grouped together rather than 
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intermixed with neutral words (Compton et al., 2003). In order to control for possible 
habituation effects within participants, no word was ever repeated. In both conditions, 
participants were told to orally state the font color of the words, which appeared in one of 
four color choices: red, green, blue, or yellow.  
A total of 100 trials were administered, equally divided into 50 trials of each 
condition. Though conditions were blocked according to emotional versus non-emotional 
words (counterbalanced order by participant), within each condition, words were 
presented in a random order that differed for each participant. Therefore, it was possible 
that several negative or positive words appeared in succession within the emotion 
condition. Stimuli were presented one at a time in uppercase 40-point Arial font in the 
center of the computer screen against a black background. Each stimulus was 
immediately preceded by a fixation cross in the middle of the screen (lasting 250 ms). 
Stimuli were presented for a maximum of 4 sec, or until the participant orally stated his 
or her response into a microphone, triggering the word to disappear immediately. The 
fixed intertrial interval lasted for 2000 ms and consisted of a blank, black screen.  
Before the task began, the following instructions appeared on the computer 
monitor and were read out loud to the participant: “Welcome to the color-naming task. 
When you see a word appear on the screen, please state the font color of each word 
presented as quickly as you can without making mistakes. Remember, you are to state the 
color of the font and ignore the word itself.” Participant’s verbal responses were 
measured via a voice-activated microphone and recorded by the computer to millisecond 
accuracy in order to track reaction time. Responses were manually coded by the 
experimenter for accuracy during the intertrial interval. A 10 trial practice session 
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(consisting of neutral words) preceded the administration of the actual task in order to 
familiarize the participant with the task. During the practice session, participants were 
given verbal feedback concerning their performance from the administrator. The total 
amount of time needed to complete the task ranged from five to seven minutes.  
Reaction time (RT) data from each participant was filtered so that only correct 
trials were included in the RT data used in the analyses. This was done in an effort to 
exclude trials that may have rewarded participants for answering quickly without regard 
for accuracy and penalized participants for taking the time to provide a correct response. 
Following this procedure, accuracy scores were reviewed to ensure that any participant 
with an accuracy score around chance (< 33%), within either condition, would be 
excluded. Examination of accuracy scores revealed that, within each condition, no 
participant obtained a score below 64%, therefore no participant was excluded for failing 
to adequately attend to or comprehend the task. This filtered RT value served as a general 
measure of performance, as indicated by response efficiency in correct trials. The 
expected emotion effect in both groups is a longer average RT in the emotional condition 
compared to the neutral condition.  
 
Word Recall Task 
A word recall task was administered as a measure of attentional bias. In a 
previous study investigating attentional bias toward threat-related, depression-related, and 
neutral words in three groups (individuals with delusions, individuals with depression, 
and controls), participants viewed 36 words printed on small cards (12 from each 
respective category), one at a time (Bentall et al., 1995). Words were intermixed and 
presented in a random order that differed in each participant. They were then asked to 
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remember as many words as possible. Number of words recalled was recorded and 
repetitions were noted as well. Attentional bias was determined by comparing the mean 
number of words recalled in each condition across groups. If a group recalled a greater 
number of words from a given list compared to the recall of other groups, this was 
thought to indicate the presence of an attentional bias. In order to determine whether 
there were specific recall biases within the individual groups, the mean number of words 
recalled from each group of words was compared within participant groups (Bentall et 
al., 1995). 
A variation of this task was employed in the current study. A total of 18 emotional 
words (half positive and half negative) and 18 non-emotional words were presented in a 
single presentation format, for a total of 36 words. Words chosen for this task were 
generated using the same procedure described above to choose words for the emotional 
Stroop task. In order to avoid carry over effects, no word used on the Stroop task was 
repeated in the word recall task. Instead of employing a card version of the task, the 
current study used a computerized version of the task. Before the task, participants saw 
following instructions on the computer screen: “You will see a group of words presented 
one at a time on the screen. Please look at each word carefully, because immediately after 
all words are presented, you will be asked to remember as many of these words as you 
can, in any order.” All 36 words were then presented singly on the screen at a fixed rate 
(1000 ms per word) in a random sequence that differed for each participant. Following 
each word, a blank screen appeared for 1000 ms before the presentation of the next word. 
Words appeared in black ink against a white background in 36-point Arial font in the 
center of the screen. Words appeared in lowercase lettering. After all of the words were 
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presented, a free recall trial took place. Participants were asked by the experimenter to 
state aloud all of the words that they remembered, in any order. Responses were recorded 
verbatim by the experimenter. Raw scores indicated how many words a participant 
recalled in each condition, which serves as a general measure of sustained attention and 
subsequent recall of visually presented verbal information. More words recalled in one 
condition compared to another suggests an attentional bias. The expected emotion effect 
in both groups is for more emotion words to be recalled as compared to neutral words. 
This task took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
 
Jumping to Conclusions Probabilistic Reasoning Task 
 Different variations of the jumping to conclusions task (JTC) exist, most of 
which are based on the Bayesian model of reasoning (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 
2007). This model describes reasoning as rooted in one’s degree of belief based on 
probability as determined by the available empirical evidence (Oaksford & Chater, 2003). 
The original and most commonly used version of the task is the ‘beads in a jar’ paradigm, 
described by Huq and colleagues (1988) in their study with deluded schizophrenia 
patients. This task requires individuals to decide which jar of colored beads a series of 
individual beads (which appear to be drawn in random sequence) is being drawn from. 
Participants are usually presented with two jars with opposite ratios (most commonly 
85:15 and 15:85) of colored beads. The jars are then hidden and an experimenter ‘draws’ 
a pre-selected series of beads one at a time. Some variations of the task require the 
participant to state which jar is being drawn from when they are sure that they have the 
correct answer (‘draws to decision’ methodology), while others present all participants 
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with the same series of beads and ask that they rate their degree of certainty that the 
beads come from a particular jar (‘draws to certainty’ method).  
A ‘realistic’ version of the beads task was developed by Dudley and colleagues. 
Instead of using beads in a jar, these authors read aloud unambiguous male and female 
names to participants, who were told that the names originated from a list of students 
from either a mostly girls (60 girls and 40 boys) or mostly boys (60 boys and 40 girls) 
school. When participants were confident they knew which list names were being read 
from, they were instructed to state their answer aloud. In order to increase task demands, 
these authors also altered the 85:15 ratio typically used in the beads task to a 60:40 ratio 
(Dudley et al., 1997b). In a separate study, these authors describe an emotional 
counterpart version of the neutral names task. In this task, participants are read aloud 
personality attributes (either negative or positive) and told that these traits originate from 
a hypothetical survey conducted about an unknown individual. On the ‘mostly good’ 
survey, 60 people made positive comments and 40 people made negative comments; on 
the ‘mostly bad’ survey, the ratio is reversed. Participants are asked to decide which 
survey the personality attributes originate from when they believe they know the correct 
answer (Dudley et al., 1997a).  
While the beads task and the ‘realistic’ names task are both considered neutral 
versions of the JTC reasoning bias, the names task was chosen for the current study. This 
was done in an effort to ensure that the emotional and non-emotional versions of each 
task were as similar as possible. Following the procedures described by Menon et al., 
three trials of each JTC task were administered. These authors used a random number 
generator in order to determine the sequence of names and personality attributes (Menon 
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et al., 2006). The current study used the same sequences described by these authors, using 
identical sequences across both conditions. The order of the emotional and neutral 
conditions was counterbalanced by participant. 
In a recent meta-analysis investigating different methods for measuring the JTC 
reasoning bias, it was reported that a tendency to gather less evidence (measured by the 
‘draws to decision’ method) was reliably associated with delusional symptomatology, 
while other indices of performance investigated did not discriminate well between 
individuals with and without delusions (Fine et al., 2007). According to this method, the 
fewer draws to decision (beads task), or pieces of information (realistic task) requested, 
the greater the JTC bias. Therefore, the current study used draws to decision as the 
primary measure of the JTC bias. As there were three trials in each condition, a total 
score for was obtained by averaging performance across trials, yielding two outcome 
scores for each participant (JTC neutral task mean score and JTC emotional task mean 
score). While these scores represented overall proficiency on the task, the emotion effect 
referred to the difference in performance between the two conditions. This task lasted 
between 5 and 10 minutes. 
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RESULTS 
 
Measures of Symptom Severity 
In terms of general illness characteristics, participants in the schizophrenia group 
reported an average illness duration of 16.17 years (SD = 11.25) and an average age of 
illness onset of 24.20 years (SD = 11.00). Individuals in the schizophrenia group were 
rated on symptom severity using the SCI-PANSS. The SCI-PANSS Positive Symptom 
Scale mean was 20.36 (SD = 5.20), the Negative Symptom Scale mean was 18.08 (SD = 
4.23), the General Psychopathology Scale mean was 37.08 (SD = 6.91), and the mean 
Composite score was 2.28 (SD = 6.76). On the individual SCI-PANSS item assessing 
delusion severity, the group mean was 4.04 (SD = 1.24), which indicated symptom 
severity in the moderate range. Examination of the raw scores among individual 
participants in the schizophrenia group revealed that all but two attained a score of at 
least 3 (mild range) on this item, indicating that almost all of the 25 schizophrenia 
participants endorsed the presence of delusional thought (within the past 6 months) 
beyond the absent/minimal ranges. 
Individuals in both the control and schizophrenia group completed a multi-
dimensional measure of delusion-proneness (PDI). The scores were as follows for the 
schizophrenia group: mean PDI Total score of 185.48 (SD = 113.77), PDI Yes/No score 
= 15.64 (SD = 8.79), PDI Distress score = 52.72 (SD = 33.75), PDI Preoccupation score 
= 52.84 (SD = 33.24), and PDI Conviction score = 64.28 (SD = 41.16). In the control 
group, the scores were: PDI Total score = 52.64 (SD = 48.64), PDI Yes/No score = 5.84 
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(SD = 4.62), PDI Distress score = 11.64 (SD = 13.29), PDI Preoccupation score = 15.52 
(SD = 15.14), and PDI Conviction score = 19.64 (SD = 17.54). See Table 1.   
PDI scores were examined between groups to determine whether the two groups 
self-reported different levels of symptomatology on this measure. It was expected that 
individuals in the schizophrenia group would report higher PDI scores on all indices. 
According to Levene's Test for equality of variances, guidelines for homogeneity of 
variance (p > 0.05) between the two groups were not met for any of the PDI indices. 
Therefore, a Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to examine between group differences on the 
PDI. This test revealed that the schizophrenia group scored statistically significantly 
higher on all PDI indices, including: PDI Total score (χ² (1) = 18.64, p < .001), PDI 
Yes/No score (χ² (1) = 16.49, p < .001), PDI Distress score (χ² (1) = 21.37, p < .001), PDI 
Preoccupation score (χ² (1) = 17.58, p < .001), and PDI Conviction score (χ² (1) = 17.98, 
p < .001). In the schizophrenia group, PDI Total scores ranged from 6 to 434 (M = 
185.48, SD = 113.77), whereas in the control group PDI Total scores ranged from 0 to 
186 (M = 52.64, SD = 48.64). See Table 1. 
Next, correlations were conducted in order to explore the relationships between 
selected measures of clinical symptoms in the schizophrenia group (control participants 
could not be included in this analysis due to the absence of SCI-PANSS scores). Since 
the PDI total score includes all other PDI subscales scores, this score was chosen for the 
purpose of exploring the relationship between self-reported delusional thought and all 
primary SCI-PANSS scores as well as the individual delusions item from the SCI-
PANSS. Examination of indices of normality revealed skewness and kurtosis values 
within acceptable ranges for all variables. A Bonferroni correction was applied to an 
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alpha value of 0.05 to control for multiple comparisons (0.05/5 = 0.01). Results revealed 
a statistically significant relationship between the PDI total score and the SCI-PANSS 
Positive symptom score (r = 0.72, p < 0.001), PANSS Composite score (r = 0.69, p < 
0.001) and SCI-PANSS delusion score (r = 0.58, p = 0.002). The relationship between 
the PDI total score and the SCI-PANSS General score showed a statistical trend that did 
not meet criteria for significance given the conservative correction applied (r = 0.44, p = 
0.03). These results indicate good reliability between the self-report measure of delusion 
propensity and observer ratings of positive symptoms (including delusions) in this 
sample. The SCI-PANSS Negative symptom score was not statistically significantly 
related to the PDI total score (r = -0.21, p = 0.31). This was expected, given that negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia include those generally thought to be unrelated to delusional 
thought (e.g., blunted affect, stereotyped thinking).    
 
Cognitive Tasks 
Primary Hypotheses 
 In order to test the primary set of hypotheses exploring potential relationships 
among group, task performance, and delusion-propensity (as measured by the PDI total 
score), statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 16.0 software. All data sets were 
complete for all participants (n = 50), so problems with missing data were not applicable. 
Since PDI total scores were used in all analyses of the main hypotheses, skewness and 
kurtosis values were examined in both groups (n = 25); none exceeded recommended 
guidelines (greater than +/- 2; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Indices of normality specific 
to each task are reported below.  
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Stroop Task Performance 
 To test the primary hypotheses within this task, a mixed ANCOVA and a series of 
paired-samples t tests were performed. In the mixed ANCOVA, one independent variable 
(IV) was group (schizophrenia or control), the second IV was task condition (emotional 
or neutral), the PDI total score was entered as a covariate, and the dependent variable 
(DV) was reaction time. Indicators of normality were examined to determine if 
recommended assumptions for this statistical test were met. An examination of skewness 
and kurtosis in each of the two groups revealed values that fell within recommended 
guidelines of +/- 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Box’s M Test for equality was 
significant (p = 0.009) indicating that the assumption of equal covariance values among 
the two levels of the dependent variable across groups was not met. According to 
Levene’s Test for equality of variances, the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p > 
0.05) in the groups was met. Given that most indices of normality fell within 
recommended guidelines, data was not transformed prior to analysis.  
 It was hypothesized that individuals with schizophrenia would respond more 
slowly (e.g., longer RT) on both the emotional and neutral versions of the Stroop task 
compared to the performance of controls on these tasks. In order to address this question, 
the main effect of group (collapsing the two conditions) was examined, which revealed a 
statistical trend for significance in the predicted direction (F (1, 46) = 2.91, p = 0.10, η2 = 
0.06). In order to address the next hypothesis, paired samples t-tests were conducted. It 
was hypothesized that, within each group, there would be a statistically significant 
emotional effect between task conditions, indicated by a difference in performance on the 
emotion (compared to neutral) task condition. This hypothesis was partially supported, as 
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results revealed that within the schizophrenia group, participants demonstrated a 
statistically significant increase in reaction time on the emotional condition (t (24) = 2.19, 
p = 0.04), while controls showed no reaction time difference between the two conditions 
(t (24) = 1.10, p = 0.28; see Figure 1). The next hypothesis was addressed by examining 
the condition by group interaction from the mixed ANCOVA in order to determine 
whether the predicted emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia group. This 
hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.01, p = 0.93, η2 < 0.01). In order to 
investigate the fourth hypothesis that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of 
delusional proneness increased for all participants (regardless of group), the condition by 
PDI total score interaction term was examined. Results did not support this hypothesis (F 
(1, 46) = 2.12, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.04). See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.   
  
Word Recall Task 
 The above described analyses were then repeated in order to investigate our 
primary hypotheses with the word recall task. An examination of indices of normality, 
including skewness and kurtosis values, Box’s M Test for equality of covariance among 
dependent variables, and Levene’s Test for equality of variances indicated that all values 
were within acceptable ranges. A mixed ANCOVA with group at the first IV, task 
condition as the second IV, number of words recalled as the DV, and PDI total score as a 
covariate was conducted. The hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia would recall 
fewer words on both the emotional and neutral conditions compared to controls was 
supported (F (1, 46) = 7.28, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.14). Paired-samples t tests were conducted to 
determine whether there was a statistically significant emotion effect (indicated by recall 
of fewer neutral compared to emotion words) in either group. Results revealed no 
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difference in the schizophrenia (t (24) = 0.00, p = 1.00) or control groups (t (24) = -0.55, 
p = 0.59). Results of the mixed ANCOVA did not indicate support for the hypothesis that 
there would be a larger emotion effect in the schizophrenia group compared to the control 
group (F (1, 46) = 0.98, p = 0.33, η2 = 0.02). Next, the hypothesis that the emotion effect 
would increase as the severity of delusional proneness increased for all participants 
(regardless of group) was addressed. The condition by PDI total score interaction from 
the mixed ANCOVA revealed that this hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.95, p 
= 0.33, η2 = 0.02). See Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.   
 
Jumping to Conclusions Probabilistic Reasoning Task 
 Finally, the same set of analyses was repeated with the data from the JTC task. In 
the mixed ANCOVA, group was the first IV, task condition was the repeated measures 
IV, number of draws to conclusion served at the DV, and PDI total score was the 
covariate. An examination of skewness and kurtosis statistics indicated values within 
acceptable ranges for all DV’s. However, values from Box’s M Test for equality of 
covariance among dependent variables (p = 0.01) and Levene’s Test for homogeneity of 
variance between groups were statistically significant (JTC neutral: p = 0.02; JTC 
emotional: p = 0.003). Data (DV scores) were then transformed using a square root 
transformation, after which all indices of normality fell within acceptable ranges.  
 The hypothesis that individuals with schizophrenia would require fewer draws to 
reach a conclusion on both the emotional and non-emotional versions of the JTC task 
compared to controls was supported (F (1, 46) = 4.82, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.10). Paired 
samples t-tests, which were conducted to determine whether there was a statistically 
significant emotion effect within each individual group, revealed no emotion effect in 
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either the schizophrenia (t (24) = 0.99, p = 0.33) or control (t (24) = 0.63, p = 0.53) 
group. Examination of the condition by group interaction effect from the ANCOVA 
revealed that the third hypothesis (emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia 
group) was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.34, p = 0.86, η2 = 0.001). The fourth hypothesis 
was that the emotion effect would increase as the severity of delusional proneness 
increased for all participants. The condition by PDI total score interaction effect revealed 
that this hypothesis was not supported (F (1, 46) = 0.62, p = 0.43, η2 = 0.01).  See Tables 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.   
 
Exploratory Analyses 
Cognitive Tasks: Valence  
 In addition to the primary hypotheses discussed, exploratory analyses were 
conducted in order to examine relationships among secondary features of the measures, 
including valence of emotional stimuli (positive or negative), which could be analyzed 
separately in both the Stroop and word recall tasks. Stroop data was analyzed first using a 
mixed ANCOVA. An examination of skewness and kurtosis within the groups revealed 
values exceeding recommended cutoffs (greater than +/- 2) for skewness in negative RT: 
control group, and kurtosis in negative RT: control group, positive RT: control group, and 
positive RT: schizophrenia group. Box’s M test for equality was significant (p = 0.008), 
indicating that the assumption of equal covariance values between levels of the dependent 
variable was violated. Levene’s Test for homogeneity of variance between groups was 
not statistically significant. For the purposes of these exploratory analyses, the ANCOVA 
was performed with the caveat that not all recommended assumptions of normality were 
satisfied. In the mixed ANCOVA, group served as an IV, valence (positive or negative) 
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was the second IV, RT was the DV, and PDI total score was entered as a covariate. An 
examination of main effects revealed that the effect of valence was statistically 
significant (F (1, 46) = 7.88, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.15), indicating that overall performance on 
this task was impacted by valence. Both groups performed better, that is they evidenced 
lower RT’s, for positive words. However, the valence by group interaction was not 
statistically significant (F (1, 46) = 1.83, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.04), nor was the valence by PDI 
total score interaction (F (1, 46) = 0.28, p = 0.64, η2 = 0.01), suggesting that the groups 
did not perform differently as a function of valence, and the effect of valence was not 
related to level of delusion-proneness. See Table 2 and 7. 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted to examine potential relationships among 
task valence, group, and PDI total score in the word recall task. An examination of 
skewness and kurtosis in each of the two groups revealed values that fell within 
recommended guidelines of +/- 2 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), with the exception of the 
positive words variable in the schizophrenia group (kurtosis value = 2.98). Box’s M Test 
for equality was not significant, nor were the values from Levene’s Test for equality of 
homogeneity of variance in the groups. Because there was only one relatively minor 
violation of normality detected, a mixed ANCOVA was performed with group as one IV, 
valence as the second IV, number of words recalled as the DV, and PDI as the covariate. 
An examination of main effects revealed that the effect of valence was not statistically 
significant (F (1, 46) = 1.07, p = 0.31, η2 = 0.02). The valence by group interaction was 
not statistically significant (F (1, 46) = 0.20, p = 0.90, η2 < 0.01), nor was the valence by 
PDI total score interaction (F (1, 46) = 1.01, p = 0.32, η2 = 0.02). See Table 2 and 8.   
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PDI Dimension Scores 
 In order to determine whether any particular subscale(s) of the PDI was more 
sensitive to differences in performance on the three sets of cognitive tasks, exploratory 
analyses were conducted. A series of mixed ANCOVAs were performed, and in all of 
these analyses, one IV was group, a second IV was condition (emotional or neutral), and 
the DV was the measure of performance in the task being examined in that analysis (i.e., 
emotional Stroop RT, words recalled, or draws to conclusion in the JTC task). Three 
analyses were conducted for each task, one with each of the PDI subscales (distress, 
preoccupation, or conviction) serving as the covariate. The condition by PDI subscale 
interaction and the group by condition by PDI subscale interaction were examined in 
each analysis to determine whether task performance differed as a function of these 
individual subscales, which were grouped together in the main analyses. None of these 
interactions of interest were statistically significant; see Tables 9, 10, and 11.  
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DISCUSSION 
  
 The aim of the study was to investigate the influence of emotional content on 
cognitive processing in individuals with schizophrenia and demographically matched 
healthy controls. Previous research has established that specific cognitive deficits related 
to reasoning and attention processes are often observed in individuals with delusions 
(e.g., Bell et al., 2006), a symptom present in a majority of individuals with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Therefore, three tasks thought to capture various types of cognitive biases 
in these cognitive domains were chosen for inclusion in the current study: an emotional 
Stroop task (selective attention to emotionally salient stimuli), a word recall task 
(preferential recall of emotional stimuli), and a jumping to conclusions task (a bias 
toward hasty decision making in probabilistic reasoning). In order to investigate the 
influence of concurrent processing of emotion during performance on the cognitive tasks 
described above, an emotional and neutral version of each task was administered. As 
subclinical delusional thought also appears to be present in individuals without a clinical 
diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (Verdoux & van Os, 2002), delusion-proneness was 
measured in both groups of participants in the current study. Data was subsequently 
analyzed in order to investigate group differences in cognitive performance, as well as 
any emotion effect (a discrepancy between emotional and neutral conditions in each set 
of tasks) that may have been present in the groups. The relationship between delusion-
proneness and the emotion effect was also investigated. Finally, exploratory analyses 
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were conducted to examine the effect of other task characteristics on performance, 
including task valence and dimensions of delusion-proneness.       
 Based on previous literature describing cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, 
specifically in relation to delusions (e.g., Rocca et al., 2006), it was hypothesized that 
individuals in the schizophrenia group would perform more poorly on all cognitive tasks 
compared to the performance of the control group. The analyses of this hypothesis 
therefore combined performance on the emotional and neutral versions of each respective 
task. This hypothesis was generally supported across all tasks, though results from the 
emotional Stroop task revealed a statistical trend for significance in the predicted 
direction (small effect size), while results from the other two tasks revealed statistically 
significant (alpha levels < 0.05) findings and effect sizes in the medium range. With this 
caveat in mind, results indicated that individuals in the schizophrenia group performed 
more poorly on the cognitive tasks compared to individuals in the control group. In the 
emotional Stroop task, this was indicated by a trend for the schizophrenia group to 
demonstrate longer response times to both emotional and neutral stimuli combined. In the 
word recall task, poorer overall performance was indicated by the tendency of individuals 
in the schizophrenia group to recall fewer words in both conditions combined. On the 
JTC task, individuals with schizophrenia requested less information before reaching a 
conclusion, again on both task conditions combined, as compared to controls. This 
pattern of results was not surprising given the ample evidence that individuals with 
schizophrenia typically display a variety of cognitive deficits, as well as the fact that 
tasks in this study were specifically chosen based on the research literature on individuals 
with delusions. Overall, results indicated that the two groups in this study performed as 
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expected on the cognitive tasks with respect to previous findings described in the 
research literature.  
 The second hypothesis specifically tested for the presence of an emotion effect 
within each group separately for each set of tasks. Results of data analyses for the word 
recall task and the JTC task revealed nonsignificant findings, indicating that an emotion 
effect was not detected for these tasks in either group. On the emotional Stroop task, an 
emotion effect was observed in the schizophrenia group. Specifically, individuals in this 
group performed statistically significantly worse in the emotional version of the task, as 
indicated by increased RT for emotion words compared to neutral words. However, no 
emotion effect was observed in the control group on the emotional Stroop task. Overall, 
these results were somewhat unexpected. It was anticipated that both groups would show 
an emotion effect in all three sets of tasks. This hypothesis was based on previous 
research indicating that the presence of emotional content in the specific cognitive tasks 
employed typically results in performance deficits in healthy controls and a variety of 
clinical groups, including those with delusions. In the control group of this study, the 
emotion effect was not observed on any of the tasks, and in the schizophrenia group it 
was only observed in the emotional Stroop task. One point that was considered in 
interpreting these findings is that previous investigations of the emotion effect in the 
word recall and JTC task are fewer in number compared to the emotional Stroop task, 
which is much more widely studied and standardized. Nevertheless, previous reports 
have demonstrated instances in which the performance of both healthy controls and 
individuals with delusions are affected by emotional content in the emotional Stroop 
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(Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Williams et al., 1996), word recall (Mathews & Barch, 2004; 
Bentall et al., 1995) and JTC tasks (Dudley et al., 1997b).   
 The hypothesis that the emotion effect would be larger in the schizophrenia group 
as compared to the control group was also not supported. The interactions of group by 
emotion condition from all three tasks were not statistically significant, and an inspection 
of effect sizes revealed no hint of an effect (η2 values ranges from 0.00 to 0.02) in any of 
the tasks. While it appears that very few previous studies have investigated this specific 
question using these tasks, several theoretical explanations for delusions predict that 
individuals with delusions will have more difficulty processing emotionally salient 
material during cognitive performance compared to controls (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 
2003). Therefore, these results were somewhat unexpected, though less so when 
considered in the context of the other findings and after accounting for the potential 
influence of task constraints.  
 Several factors are relevant to understanding the apparent lack of a difference in 
the magnitude of an emotion effect between the groups. The most salient of these factors 
is that an emotion effect was not observed in either of the groups, with the exception of 
the emotional Stroop task, for which the effect was only present in the schizophrenia 
group. Given that the emotion manipulation generally did not produce the expected 
effects on performance, the absence of a larger emotion effect in the schizophrenia group 
made sense, especially for the JTC and word recall task. In order to better explain these 
findings, each task will be considered individually to account for task specific 
characteristics of potential relevance.  
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 Examination of results of the word recall task revealed that, not only did the 
schizophrenia group fail to demonstrate an emotion effect, this group had identical mean 
scores on the emotional and neutral conditions (2.72 words). The control group showed a 
similar pattern of performance, though qualitatively, there was a very small difference in 
mean scores between conditions that was not statistically significant. This finding was 
partially consistent with a previous study of attentional biases in a word recall task in 
individuals with persecutory delusions, individuals with depression, and healthy controls 
(Bentall et al., 1995). These authors reported that the delusion group showed a bias 
toward recall of threat-related and depression-related words, while controls did not. The 
current study did not detect a bias in either group, however important differences in 
group composition and task design may partially account for these seemingly discrepant 
findings. Bentall et al. (1995) limited their delusion group to those with persecutory 
delusions, while the current study included individuals with other subtypes of delusions. 
Furthermore, in the Bentall et al. study, emotion words were limited to those that were 
thought to be personally relevant (i.e., threat-related) to the persecutory group (depression 
words were included for the depression group), while the current study included general 
emotion words equally mixed between positive and negative valence and matched for 
intensity. This was done to account for the inclusion of a mixed delusion group, and to 
ensure that the emotion task was also relevant to controls.  
 While Bentall et al. (1995) found no recall bias in their control group, other 
studies have reported an effect of emotional words in similar recall tasks with a healthy 
control group using general positive and negative emotion words (e.g., Mathews & 
Barch, 2004). These authors sought to compare the performance of healthy controls to 
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that of schizophrenia patients with the hypothesis that patients with specific negative 
symptoms would fail to show an emotion effect. These authors found that both the 
control group and the schizophrenia group showed an emotion effect, and that this effect 
was not larger in one group or the other. Interestingly, the severity of blunted affect in 
patients was associated with a smaller emotion effect in this study, while positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia were unrelated to the magnitude of the emotion effect 
(Mathews & Barch, 2004). Similarly, the current study also failed to find a relationship 
between delusions (a positive symptom) and the magnitude of emotion effect in the word 
recall task. It should be noted that the recall task employed by Mathews and Barch (2004) 
was an incidental-encoding task which required participants to evaluate words for 
valence and intensity immediately followed by a surprise free recall trial. In contrast, the 
task used in the current study was a passive task that merely exposed participants to each 
word very briefly, followed by a free recall trial. This was done in an effort to reduce the 
influence of task complexity and/or the use of memory strategies in healthy controls on 
recall performance. However, it is possible that the effortful processing component of the 
task used by Mathews and Barch was a more effective means for investigating the effect 
of concurrent emotion processing during a traditional cognitive task. Overall, it is 
possible that using a task that 1) included words that were more salient to individuals 
with delusions and 2) using a task with a more active encoding component may have 
resulted in an emotion effect in the current study.  
 Previous studies of attention bias have suggested that valence may influence the 
degree of bias to particular emotion words (Strauss & Allen, 2009), so this factor was 
examined in the current study. Within the word recall task, an analysis of valence effects 
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indicated that participants in both groups performed similarly, regardless of whether 
emotion words were positive or negative, and valence was not related to level of 
delusion-proneness. Therefore, it is unlikely that combining positive and negative words 
in the emotion condition had an appreciable influence on the results of the word recall 
analyses.  
 Examination of the lack of an emotion effect in the JTC task both within and 
between the groups revealed several possible factors that may have contributed to this 
finding. One factor of interest was task type. While the majority of previous research has 
utilized the traditional ‘beads’ version of the task, the current study employed the less 
frequently used ‘names’ version as the neutral condition. This task was designed to be 
used in comparative studies of the emotionally salient JTC bias as it serves as a more 
realistic neutral comparison task than the beads task (Dudley et al., 1997a). In the first 
study using the names task, it was reported that individuals with delusions required less 
evidence before coming to a conclusion compared to healthy controls, which was noted 
to be consistent with previous findings from the beads task (Dudley et al., 1997a). These 
authors also reported that mean JTC scores for the beads and names versions of the 
neutral task were similar in their sample (Dudley et al., 1997b). Thus, there is support for 
the notion that the names task is comparable with the beads task. Nevertheless, given that 
the majority of prior research that influenced the hypotheses concerning JTC 
performance in the current study employed the beads task, the use of the names task 
cannot be ruled out as a possible factor contributing to the results of the current study.  
 The emotional JTC task used in the current study was based on the ‘survey’ task 
described by Dudley et al. (1997a), however, while these authors reported an emotion 
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effect in both the delusion and control groups when contrasting the neutral names task 
with the emotional survey task, the current study failed to find such an effect. These 
authors did not include an analysis of the comparison of the size of the emotion effect 
between groups in this article. However this information was available in a recent review 
article (Fine et al., 2007) and these authors reported that there was no difference between 
the size of the emotion effects in the psychiatric versus nonpsychiatric groups in the 
Dudley et al. (1997a) study, which is consistent with findings from the current study. In a 
study conducted by Warman and colleagues (2007) using the emotional JTC task, it was 
reported that individuals with delusions gathered significantly less information than 
control participants in both the neutral and emotional tasks. However, unlike Dudley et 
al. (1997a), these authors did not detect the presence of a statistically significant emotion 
effect in either group. While our findings regarding the lack of an emotion effect in the 
JTC task are therefore consistent with that of Warman et al. (2007), it should be noted 
that they used a slightly different version of the survey task that added a self-referent 
component to the emotional stimuli presented. Taken together with findings from the 
current study, it appears that the emotional version of the JTC task has yielded 
inconsistent results regarding effectiveness of the task in producing an emotion effect.   
 Other possible factors that may have contributed to the lack of a statistically 
significant emotion effect in the JTC task include the limit placed on information 
available to a participant before a conclusion is reached, and the limited number of 
participants who displayed an extreme responding style. In the current study, participants 
were given up to 10 possible pieces of information (names in the neutral condition and 
personality traits in the emotional condition) before they were essentially forced to make 
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a decision. Though previous studies using the JTC task often do not state whether or not 
such a limit was in place, some have reported a limit of 20 units of information using the 
specific versions of the task employed in the current study (Warman et al., 2007). In the 
current study, a somewhat arbitrary cutoff of 10 pieces of information was selected based 
on the notion that basic limits on working memory would limit the usefulness of 
increasing units of information past a certain point. In other words, since the current 
study did not include a memory aid, it was reasoned that by the time a participant was 
given a 15th clue, they would likely have forgotten the first clue. Coupled with previously 
published mean and standard deviation scores on this task, 10 units of information 
appeared to be a reasonable cutoff point. However, an examination of the raw data 
revealed that a number of participants, particularly in the control group, requested the 
maximum 10 pieces of information on both the neutral and emotional conditions. It is 
possible that employing a limit of 20 possible pieces of information would have yielded 
larger group differences, thus affecting the results of statistical analyses related to the 
presence and magnitude of emotion effects.  
 Another trend that became apparent when examining the raw scores on the JTC 
task is the relatively low number of participants showing a “jumping to conclusions 
reasoning style,” which is defined as coming to a conclusion after two or fewer trials 
(Garety et al., 2005). While this index of performance was not used in any of the data 
analysis, an examination of these scores revealed that participants in the current study did 
not perform as expected given previous reports that 40 – 70% of individuals with 
delusions make decisions after one or two draws (White & Mansell, 2009). In the current 
study, the percentage of participants in the schizophrenia group (most of whom reported 
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delusions) with this JTC reasoning style was noticeably lower (12% in the neutral 
condition; 20% in the emotional condition). Furthermore, it has been reported that 
between 10 – 20% of healthy controls show the JTC reasoning style (Freeman, 2007), 
however in the current study no controls demonstrated this pattern of performance on 
either task condition. Therefore, it appears that while mean scores on the task obtained in 
the current study are comparable with past reports, this may be more related to the limit 
placed on available pieces of information combined with relatively few participants 
demonstrating the JTC reasoning style.  
 Findings from the JTC and word recall task showed no emotion effect within 
groups, and no difference in the size of the emotion effect between groups. It is 
somewhat puzzling, however, that the schizophrenia group did not show a larger emotion 
effect than the control group on the emotional Stroop task, considering that this group 
demonstrated the predicted emotion effect, while the control group did not. However, an 
examination of the means and standard deviations of Stroop RT values in both groups 
provides qualitative information about observed performance patterns in the groups that 
may shed some light on this finding. Although the difference in RT values between 
conditions was statistically significant only in the schizophrenia group, both groups 
performed faster in the neutral condition and displayed similar amounts of variability 
among RT values. The degree of the difference between neutral and emotional conditions 
was slightly larger in the schizophrenia group, which accounts for the finding that this 
group showed the predicted emotion effect. When this effect is compared between groups 
however, there is no hint of a difference, and this is likely due to the fact that overall, the 
groups performed very similarly.  
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 In what appears to be the first study using the emotional Stroop task to investigate 
attentional bias in individuals with delusions, Bentall and Kaney (1989) reported that 
individuals with persecutory delusions showed a greater degree of interference (i.e. a 
larger emotion effect) for paranoia words compared to both a depression and control 
group. Interestingly, these authors reported that when paranoid words and depressive 
words were combined to form an emotional condition and then compared to the neutral 
words, there were no differences in amount of interference among the groups. Only when 
the paranoid words were separated from the more general negative words (this study did 
not include a positive word condition) did group differences in interference emerge 
(Bentall & Kaney, 1989). In the current study, a comparable emotion effect was not 
detected between the schizophrenia and the control group. Partially consistent with the 
findings described by Bentall and Kaney (1989), the current study did detect an emotion 
effect within the schizophrenia group, specifically this group performed faster in the 
neutral versus emotional task condition. However, unlike Bentall and Kaney (1989), the 
current study did not observe an emotion effect in the control group.  
 In a different study investigating attentional bias to emotionally salient material in 
individuals with persecutory delusions, it was reported that the persecutory group 
demonstrated an emotion effect for both positive and negative words (compared to 
neutral words), and that this effect was larger in the delusion group compared to the 
control group, whose performance did not differ as a function of word type (Kinderman, 
1994). However, this author used negative and positive self-esteem adjectives versus 
neutral adjectives in their emotional Stroop task. Again, results of the current study are 
partially consistent in that there was an emotion effect in the schizophrenia group and the 
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absence of an emotion effect in the control group, however there was no difference in the 
magnitude of emotion effect between the groups.  
 The reason(s) for the apparent mix of consistent and inconsistent findings among 
these studies and the current study are not immediately clear, though it is possible that 
task differences placed a role. Both Bentall and Kaney (1989) and Kinderman (1994) 
used a card version of the Stroop task, which provides a less fine grained approach to 
measuring reaction time compared to the computerized version of the task used in the 
current study. Task stimuli in the emotion condition also differed significantly among all 
three studies, with the current study using negative and positive emotion words, Bentall 
and Kaney employing paranoia and depressive words, and Kinderman using positive and 
negative self-esteem adjectives. Compared to both of these previous studies, the 
emotional stimuli used in the current study was of a more general nature and no attempt 
was made to ensure that emotion words would be personally relevant to the delusion 
group. Additionally, both of these studies utilized a persecutory delusion group, while the 
current study used a mixed delusion group.  
 The combination of these two factors may have been of particular importance in 
determining the nature of an emotion effect in the current study given previous findings 
described by Fear and colleagues (1996a). In their study of individuals with delusional 
disorder (a subset of whom had persecutory delusions), the delusion group as a whole 
displayed greater interference for threatening words compared to controls (who showed 
no emotion effect), however individuals within the delusion group with non-persecutory 
delusions also showed greater interference for other types of emotionally salient words 
(anxiety and sadness words) compared to controls (Fear, Sharpy, & Healy, 1996a). In a 
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separate publication utilizing the same sample, it was reported that medication status also 
had an effect on task performance, in that the unmedicated group showed a greater degree 
of interference for threat and anxiety valenced words compared to medicated patients 
with delusional disorder (Fear & Healy, 1996b). Taken together, these prior studies seem 
to highlight the importance of using words that are not just emotionally salient, but also 
have self-referent value, a factor which may then differ depending on other features such 
as delusion subtype and even medication status.  
 In an investigation of emotional Stroop performance in individuals with 
schizophrenia who were subdivided based on PANSS symptom ratings, it was 
hypothesized that severity of negative symptoms would be related to a greater emotion 
effect for negative words (Demily et al., 2009). Of all of the studies discussed thus far, 
this one used a task that most closely approximated the one in the current study – a 
computerized emotional Stroop task containing neutral words and positively and 
negatively valenced emotion words selected to minimize personal relevance to 
participants. Though these authors were primarily interested in differences in the negative 
syndrome patients, they included a positive symptom subgroup and a control group, thus 
several findings from the current study can be compared to that of Demily et al. (2009). 
Consistent with findings from the current study showing no difference in the size of 
emotion effects between the groups, these authors reported that the schizophrenia group 
(combining positive and negative patients) showed the same degree of interference for 
emotion words as controls. In this study, the schizophrenia group responded more slowly 
overall compared to controls on all task conditions (in the current study, this finding was 
a statistical trend). Demily et al. (2009) also reported that, although both the 
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schizophrenia group and control group demonstrated an emotion effect (both groups were 
faster in the neutral condition), there was no significant difference between RT as a 
function of valence within or between the groups. This finding was partially consistent 
with that of the current study, which found that while task valence had an impact on 
overall performance (both groups performed better with positive words compared to 
negative words), there were no between group differences as a function of valence. 
Finally, these authors also reported that there was no difference in emotion effect related 
to severity of either negative or positive symptoms as measured by the PANSS (Demily 
et al., 2009). In the current study, there was no difference in emotion effect related to 
delusion-proneness.   
 So far, the discussion of the emotion effect in the current study has focused on 
differences within or between participants based on diagnostic groups that categorize 
them by schizophrenia status. However, throughout this discussion, previous literature 
that has been referred to frequently employs other approaches to group assignment, 
namely 1) grouping participants by delusion or positive symptom status; and 2) selecting 
or grouping participants by delusion subtype (primarily persecutory subtypes). Although 
diagnostic category was considered a relevant grouping factor in the current study, an 
alternative method for investigating potential differences in the emotion effect was also 
used. All participants were administered a measure of delusion-proneness (the PDI) and 
scores from this measure were entered as a covariate in all analyses in order to explore 
the possibility that the emotion effect was more closely related to delusion-proneness 
rather than diagnostic group. This hypothesis was not supported, as the interaction 
between task condition and PDI total score was not significant in any of the previously 
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described analyses of emotion effects. Additionally, exploratory analyses investigating 
whether a particular dimension of delusion-proneness was associated with the emotion 
effect were not statistically significant for any of the cognitive tasks administered. 
 Previous research has suggested that investigating cognitive biases in individuals 
with schizophrenia may mask the presence of putative deficits that are specific to 
individual symptoms such as delusions (Aleman & David, 2006). These authors have 
advocated the approach of investigating single symptoms of the disorder in order to 
determine what factors maintain or even predict those symptoms. Previous research has 
also suggested that characteristic reasoning and attention biases appear to be related to 
delusions, and that concurrent processing of emotional stimuli may amplify these biases 
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). In the current study, this question was addressed by 
examining whether emotion effects would increase as the severity of delusional 
proneness increased across all participants. While it was expected that delusion-
proneness would be related to the degree of emotion effects on all tasks regardless of 
diagnostic group, this was not the case. Given the previously discussed finding that the 
magnitude of emotion effects did not differ between the groups for any of the tasks, the 
findings with the PDI are not entirely surprising when considering that PDI scores were 
also higher in the schizophrenia group. In other words, since there a good degree of 
overlap between diagnostic group and increased delusion-proneness, the two hypotheses 
were not getting at entirely independent questions. Still, past studies have reported that 
differences that may not be apparent between diagnostic groups are apparent when 
considering level of delusion-proneness. For instance, in an investigation of the JTC data-
gathering bias, a difference in performance was detected when participants were grouped 
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by delusion status, but this difference disappeared when participants were grouped by 
diagnosis (Peters et al., 2007). It was therefore plausible to predict that the PDI total score 
or perhaps one of the dimension scores from the measure would be more sensitive to 
differences in performance between the neutral and emotion conditions in each set of 
cognitive tasks. It is worth noting again that in general, there was little variation in 
performance between the neutral versus emotional task conditions. Had the predicted 
emotion effects emerged, the finding that PDI score was not related to degree of emotion 
effect would be more meaningful. For this reason, though results of the current study 
provide no direct support for the theory that increased delusion-proneness is uniquely 
related to a deficit in processing emotional stimuli during cognitive performance (at least 
not on the tasks employed here), these results should not be considered conclusive.  
 The lack of the presence of an emotion effect in all tasks except the emotional 
Stroop task in the schizophrenia group presents a challenge when attempting to fit the 
current findings with theoretical accounts of cognitive and emotional processes in 
delusions. Irrespective of the emotional effects, the current study did find overall support 
for the presence of group differences in basic cognitive task performance, though the 
group difference in the emotional Stroop task was a statistical trend. These findings add 
to the established literature describing reasoning and attention biases in individuals with 
schizophrenia. However, the main aim of the current study was to test hypotheses related 
to theories of the relationship between cognitive and emotional processing related to 
delusional thought. For instance, Garety et al. (2007) have suggested that emotion plays a 
direct role in the development of delusions via the influence of affective processes on 
cognitive appraisals. Though the current study did not directly assess the role of cognition 
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or emotion in delusional development, it could be argued that the findings do not support 
the general idea that emotional processes impact cognitive processes in a different or 
unique way in individuals with delusions. However, this conclusion fails to account for 
many alternative explanations for the findings presented here. Though several possible 
shortcomings of the actual measures have already been discussed, there is the larger issue 
of the generalizability of laboratory simulations of the presumably complex cognitive and 
emotional processes that lead an individual to develop and maintain an intricate web of 
delusional beliefs. It is difficult to design tasks that assess the most relevant thought 
processes underlying delusions. However, it is encouraging that a growing body of past 
research has shown specific tasks, such as the JTC task, to be useful in assessing a 
particular reasoning bias that does appear to be related in some way to the presence of 
delusions. It is also promising that findings from the current study do suggest that 
participants in the group comprised primarily of individuals with delusions did not 
perform as well as healthy controls on the tasks as a whole. The failure to detect larger 
emotion effects in this study may indicate that the added presence of an emotional 
component did not hinder cognitive processing on the tasks administered in any 
appreciable way in individuals with schizophrenia. Alternatively, it may very well be that 
material must be emotionally salient to delusion content in order for significant effects to 
emerge, or that emotion interacts with cognition at some other stage or in a different 
manner than what was assessed in the current study. Therefore, it would be premature to 
assume that an individual’s lack of preferential recall of emotional words related to a 
psychiatric diagnosis or self-ratings of delusional thought disproves the notion that 
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cognitive and emotional processes are working together to maintain this individual’s 
delusions.     
 Several limitations of the current study have been discussed, including potential 
constraints of the task versions used, effectiveness of the emotion stimuli selected, and 
methods of grouping participants. Other limitations include those related to demographic 
features, sample size, and the reliance of self-report ratings on one of the measures. In 
terms of group composition, gender was unevenly divided in both groups, with males 
comprising approximately two thirds of each group. The schizophrenia group was not 
matched to the control group on years of education, though they were matched on the 
premorbid estimate of intelligence and parental education. Though a power analysis 
suggested that the sample size (25 participants in each group) was likely sufficient to 
detect group differences in the current study, there were other limitations imposed by the 
relatively small number of participants in each group. Given the pattern of results, it may 
have been informative, as an exploratory analysis, to examine the impact of delusion 
subtype (e.g., persecutory, grandiose) on performance. Though this information can be 
gleaned from the PDI, a substantially larger number of participants would be needed in 
order to get adequate numbers of individuals from each subtype. The use of the PDI 
could also be considered a limitation, as this measure relies on self-report of individuals 
from a population that may be hesitant to answer or endorse certain items due to paranoia 
or other illness factors (e.g., poor insight). However, observer ratings of symptoms in the 
current study indicate agreement between observed and self-reported symptoms related to 
delusions. In particular, there was a statistically significant relationship between the SCI-
PANSS Positive symptom score (observer-ratings based on a structured interview) and 
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the self-report total score from the PDI (r = 0.72, p < 0.001), suggesting considerable 
overlap between symptoms that were observed and assessed by the experimenter and 
those that were reported by participants in the schizophrenia group.   
 Despite these limitations, results of the current study are useful for guiding future 
research. Taken together with much of the theoretical and applied research that has been 
reviewed, results of the current study suggest a need for a more thorough evaluation of 
optimal methods for creating emotional versions of the tasks. Once a reliable method for 
inducing emotion in healthy controls is determined, this method can be tested in patient 
groups and then in relation to individual symptoms. It is possible that what constitutes an 
emotionally salient task in one group is different for another group, and so the possibility 
of a more fine grained approach to altering stimuli could be explored. Alternatively or in 
addition, future studies may want to include participant ratings of stimuli from both 
conditions in order to ensure that neutral stimuli is really perceived as neutral and 
emotional stimuli as emotional. The use of realistic scenarios to explore emotional 
salience may also be preferable to more contrived laboratory based manipulations, though 
this is often time consuming and tends to create added variance from uncontrolled 
variables. Overall, it seems that future studies using improved methods for increasing 
emotional salience of task stimuli would better address questions regarding magnitude of 
emotion effects. 
 Apart from the findings related to emotion effects, the finding that individuals in 
the schizophrenia group generally performed more poorly than the control group on the 
cognitive tasks administered could also inform future research. To date, the line of work 
investigating the treatment of cognitive deficits in individuals with schizophrenia and/or 
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delusions is quite new. In a very recent study, it was reported that a brief session of 
‘reasoning training’ was associated with improved performance on the JTC task in 
individuals with delusions and a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Ross et al., 2009). These 
authors also reported that, subsequent to reasoning training, some participants reported 
increased flexibility and decreased conviction of delusional beliefs, though this finding 
was not statistically significant. Future research should continue to explore the 
mechanisms underlying the cognitive processes of delusional thought so that more 
refined approaches to treatment can be developed and tested, as the need to improve the 
everyday emotional functioning of individuals with delusions is undeniably tied to 
symptom reduction or relief.  
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APPENDIX A: PHONE SCREENING FORM (CONTROL GROUP) 
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PHONE SCREEN FOR CONTROL GROUP 
 
Full Name of Potential Participant: 
Phone Number:       (         )         - Interviewer Initials: 
Date of Phone Screen:             /          /      
  
“Hi. My name is ________ and I’m calling from the Psychology Department at the University of 
Central Florida in response to the phone message that you left, indicating interest in our research 
study. May I ask how you learned about our study?” (USE ANSWER TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER CONTROL OR SCHIZOPHRENIA PROBAND) 
 
“Before I explain the study, we need to determine whether you are eligible for this particular 
study. What is your current age? ________ (note: exclude if under 18 or over 60). To see if you 
are eligible, I will list a series of statements and, at the end of the list, you will say "yes" or "no" 
to indicate whether you would answer at least one of the items from the list as being true for you. 
In this way, we will not know which items from the list are true for you, in order to protect your 
confidentiality. Please think about each item after I read it, but only answer "yes" or "no" after 
I've read all items. Please answer “no” unless you are fairly sure that an item applies to you. Do 
you have any questions or concerns about this before I begin the list? 
 
Exclusion List (Only get a "yes" or "no" at the very end of each list – NOT after each item): 
• "At some point in my life, I got hit in the head so hard that I blacked out for more than 10 
minutes." 
• "I've experienced one or more seizures after the age of 5." 
• "I've been diagnosed with a stroke, brain tumor, or other serious neurological disorder - like 
Parkinson’s disease." 
• "In the past month, I have used alcohol or drugs to the point that it affected my functioning at 
school, work, or personal relationships." 
• "During at least one point in my life, I received inpatient hospitalization for alcohol or drug 
dependence." 
 
"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
"Now we will do the same thing with another list of items. Please remember to wait until the end 
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you." 
• "I am color blind to some extent." 
• "I currently have significant problems with my vision, even when wearing glasses or 
contacts." 
• "I have significant difficulty with moving or feeling the arm or hand that I use for writing." 
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• "I have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism, Asperger’s disorder, or 
schizoaffective disorder at some point in my life." 
 
• "I have a family member who I'm biologically related to, who has been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder at some point in their life." 
 
"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
"Now we will do the same thing with one last set of items. Please remember to wait until the end 
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you." 
 
• “I have been diagnosed with AIDS, Lupus, congestive heart disease, or insulin-dependent 
diabetes.” 
 
• “I have been diagnosed with dyslexia or another specific learning disability.” 
 
• “I have had surgery on my nose or sinuses.” 
• "English is not the first language that I spoke as a child." 
• “I have received electroconvulsive therapy in the past six months.” 
• “I have been prescribed antipsychotic medication at some point in my life.” 
 
"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
If "YES" to any list above  – "Thank you for your openness with this procedure. Unfortunately, 
you do not qualify for this particular study because you endorsed at least one of these factors 
which could influence your performance on the tasks in our study. We appreciate your time 
completing this brief phone screen. Do you have any questions I can address?" 
 
IF "NO" – "Thanks for going through this list with me. It sounds like you qualify for participation 
in our study. Can I give you a brief overview of what the study involves, so that you can decide if 
you'd like to participate?" 
 
“We are conducting a study to examine differences in thinking ability and perception as it relates 
to a psychiatric disorder called schizophrenia. We are interested in having you participate in a 
community comparison group so that we can look at differences in your performance with the 
performance of individuals with schizophrenia and their family members. We hope to gain 
information that may lead to better treatment or ways to prevent schizophrenia.” 
 
"The study will take place in our research laboratory in the Psychology Building on the main 
campus of the University of Central Florida in east Orlando. You will be provided with detailed 
directions and free parking in front of the building. During this meeting, we will interview you 
about your mental and physical health and you will be asked to complete some questionnaires 
about psychological experiences you may have had. After this interview, we will ask you to 
complete a series of thinking ability and perception tasks. We would also like to collect a sample 
of your DNA by swabbing the inside of your cheek with a small brush. All information you 
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provide will remain strictly confidential. Your name will not be used in any report or 
presentation. This meeting would last about 3.5 hours. You will be paid by check at the end of the 
meeting at the rate of $8 for each 30 minutes of participation, so you can expect to be paid 
approximately $56, although the exact time and amount may vary slightly for each participant. 
 
"Are there any questions or concerns about that I can address for you?"   
 
"Are you willing to participate, with the understanding that you can discontinue participation at 
any point, for any reason, without penalty?" 
IF SO – schedule date and time: ____________________________ 
 
"I have a map and directions to send you to help you find our building. Would you prefer that I e-
mail, fax, or mail these to you?" (INCLUDE INFORMATION BELOW) - Send our cover letter 
with appointment date and time, along with map/directions. 
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APPENDIX B: PHONE SCREENING FORM (SCHIZOPHRENIA 
GROUP) 
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PHONE SCREEN FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA GROUP 
 
Full Name of Potential Participant: 
Phone Number:       (         )         - Interviewer Initials: 
Date of Phone Screen:             /          /      
 
“Hi. My name is _________ and I’m calling from the Psychology Department at the University 
of Central Florida in response to the phone message that you left, indicating interest in our 
research study. May I ask how you learned about our study?” (USE ANSWER TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER CONTROL OR SCHIZOPHRENIA PROBAND) 
 
“Before I explain the study, we need to determine whether you are eligible for this particular 
study. What is your current age? ________ (Note: exclude if under 18 or over 60).   
 
• Has a doctor told you that have a diagnosis of schizophrenia?  YES  /  NO 
• What are the names of the medications that you are currently prescribed (do not need 
doses – ask participant to look at their prescription bottles if unsure): 
 
__________________   __________________  __________________  
 
__________________  __________________  __________________ 
 
(Note: Needs to report a diagnosis of schizophrenia from some type of doctor/psychologist. Also, 
needs to be currently prescribed some type of antipsychotic medication. Otherwise, explain these 
criteria and discontinue screen). 
 
To see if you are eligible, I will list a series of statements and, at the end of the list, you will say 
"yes" or "no" to indicate whether you would answer at least one of the items from the list as being 
true for you. In this way, we will not know which items from the list are true for you, in order to 
protect your confidentiality. Please think about each item after I read it, but only answer "yes" or 
"no" after I've read all items. Please answer “no” unless you are fairly sure that an item applies to 
you. Do you have any questions or concerns about this before I begin the list? 
 
Exclusion List (Only get a "yes" or "no" at the very end of each list – NOT after each item): 
• "At some point in my life, I got hit in the head so hard that I blacked out for more than 10 
minutes." 
• "I've experienced one or more seizures after the age of 5." 
• "I've been diagnosed with a stroke, brain tumor, or other serious neurological disorder - like 
Parkinson’s disease." 
• "In the past month, I have used alcohol or drugs to the point that it affected my functioning at 
school, work, or personal relationships." 
• "During at least one point in my life, I received inpatient hospitalization for alcohol or drug 
dependence." 
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"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
"Now we will do the same thing with another list of items. Please remember to wait until the end 
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you." 
• "I am color blind to some extent." 
• "I currently have significant problems with my vision, even when wearing glasses or 
contacts." 
• "I have significant difficulty with moving or feeling the arm or hand that I use for writing." 
• “I have received electroconvulsive therapy in the past six months.” 
 
"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
"Now we will do the same thing with one last set of items. Please remember to wait until the end 
of the list to indicate whether at least one of them applies to you." 
 
• “I have been diagnosed with AIDS, Lupus, congestive heart disease, or insulin-dependent 
diabetes.” 
 
• “I have been diagnosed with dyslexia or another specific learning disability.” 
 
• “I have had surgery on my nose or sinuses.” 
• “English is not the first language that I spoke as a child.” 
 
"Without telling me which item, would you have answered "yes" to at least one item I just 
listed?"   YES    /    NO (IF YES, skip to below) 
 
If "YES" to any list above  – "Thank you for your openness with this procedure. Unfortunately, 
you do not qualify for this particular study because you endorsed at least one of these factors 
which could influence your performance on the tasks in our study. We appreciate your time 
completing this brief phone screen. Do you have any questions I can address?" 
 
IF "NO" – "Thanks for going through this list with me. It sounds like you qualify for participation 
in our study. Can I give you a brief overview of what the study involves, so that you can decide if 
you'd like to participate?" 
 
“We are conducting a study to examine differences in thinking ability and perception as it relates 
to schizophrenia. We are interested in having you participate in the group of individuals who have 
schizophrenia, so that we can compare the performance to individuals without schizophrenia. We 
hope to gain information that may one day lead to better treatment or ways to prevent 
schizophrenia.” 
 
"The study will take place in our research laboratory in the Psychology Building on the main 
campus of the University of Central Florida in east Orlando. You will be provided with detailed 
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directions and free parking in front of the building. During this meeting, we will interview you 
about your mental and physical health and you will be asked to complete some questionnaires 
about psychological experiences you may have had. After this interview, we will ask you to 
complete a series of thinking ability and perception tasks. We would also like to collect a sample 
of your DNA by swabbing the inside of your cheek with a small brush. All information you 
provide will remain strictly confidential. Your name will not be used in any report or 
presentation. This meeting would last about 4 hours. You will be paid by check at the end of the 
meeting at the rate of $8 for each 30 minutes of participation, so you can expect to be paid 
approximately $64, although the exact time and amount may vary slightly for each participant. 
 
"Are there any questions or concerns about that I can address for you?"   
 
"Are you willing to participate, with the understanding that you can discontinue participation at 
any point, for any reason, without penalty?" 
IF SO – schedule date and time: ____________________________ 
 
"I have a map and directions to send you to help you find our building. Would you prefer that I e-
mail, fax, or mail these to you?" (INCLUDE INFORMATION BELOW) - Send our cover letter 
with appointment date and time, along with map/directions. 
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APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
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TITLE:  Cognitive Functioning in Schizophrenia 
 
Investigator:   Diana Orem, M.S., Doctoral Student 
Supervisor:   Jeffrey S. Bedwell, Ph.D., Assistant Professor,  
Department of Psychology, University of Central Florida, 
Orlando, FL 
 
CONSENT FORM TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
     
Introduction 
You are being invited to participate in the research as titled above. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or withdraw your consent 
at any time without giving reason and without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled. You may ask to have your information removed from the research 
records or destroyed. You will be one of approximately 50 participants in this research 
study. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between thinking ability/ 
perception and schizophrenia. We are also interested in the genetic transmission of these 
factors. A better understanding of these relationships may provide information that leads 
to better treatment and ways to prevent schizophrenia. 
 
Duration and Location 
Your participation is anticipated to last between 4 and 4.5 hours (although this varies by 
participant) and will take place in the Clinical Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory (Rm. 
137) in the Psychology Building on the main campus of the University of Central Florida 
(east Orlando). 
 
Procedures 
  During this study, the following will occur:  
1.  You will answer questions about basic demographic information. 
2.  You will participate in a psychological interview about psychological and medical 
history and current psychological symptoms. 
3.  You will complete some self-report scales of emotional and psychological 
experiences. 
4.  You will complete a series of tasks that measure your smell ability and emotional 
processing. 
 
Exclusions 
There are some criteria or characteristics that may make you ineligible to participate in 
this study.  Each potential participant will be individually evaluated for eligibility through 
a two step process: 1) the initial phone screen that you’ve already completed, and 2) an 
interview and measures during the first part of today’s session. If you are excluded at any 
point during the session, you will be paid for your time spent up to that point. 
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Early Withdrawal by You or the Investigator 
If, during the course of participating in the study, you decide you do not want to continue 
to participate (for any reason), please inform the investigator or a member of his research 
team. You will be paid for each 30 minute interval you participated in (rounded to nearest 
half hour) and will not be penalized in any way for early withdrawal.  
 
Risks and Discomforts 
In rare instances, this study may involve mild emotional discomfort due to personal 
questions asked during the interview or may become frustrated by difficulty thinking 
ability tasks. You do not have to answer questions which make you feel uncomfortable 
and you may stop participation at any time.   
 
Benefits 
You may not receive any personal benefit from participating in this study besides being 
paid for your time. The information gathered from this research may lead to better 
treatments for schizophrenia. 
 
Payment and Costs to Participation 
You will not incur any costs due to your participation in this study. You will receive a 
check for $8 per half hour that you participated (rounded to the nearest half hour) at the 
end of the research session. The total length of the session is estimated at 4 to 4.5 hours, 
which translates to a payment between $64 and $72, although this will vary by 
participant. If you decline to participate during this informed consent procedure, you will 
not receive payment. 
 
New Findings 
You will be given any new information gained during the course of this study that might 
affect your willingness to continue participation in the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
Every effort will be taken to protect your identity. This form, which contains your name, 
will be kept in a separate secure file cabinet from the rest of your information from the 
study. Questionnaires and tests will not include your name. You will not be identified in 
any presentation or publication of this study or its results. Your DNA sample will be 
stored in a container that only has a random ID# and date written on it. Please note: we 
may have to notify the proper authorities (without your permission) if you lead us to 
believe that you are in imminent danger of physically harming yourself or others. 
 
Questions 
If you have questions regarding the study, you may call Jeffrey Bedwell, Ph.D. at 407-
823-5858 or e-mail him at jbedwell@mail.ucf.edu.  
 
Injury 
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you 
may file a claim with UCF Environmental Health & Safety, Risk and Insurance Office, 
P.O. Box 163500, Orlando, FL 32816-3500 (407) 823-6300.  The University of Central 
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Florida is an agency of the State of Florida for purposes of sovereign immunity and the 
university’s and the state’s liability for personal injury or property damage is extremely 
limited under Florida law.  Accordingly, the university’s and the state’s ability to 
compensate you for any personal injury or property damage suffered during this research 
project is very limited. 
Consent to Participate 
 
My signature below indicates that I agree with the information described above and 
voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  Any questions I have about this study have 
been clearly answered.   
 
Authorization and Signatures 
 
I am the Research Participant or am authorized to act on behalf of the Research 
Participant. I have read this Authorization, and I will receive a copy of this 
Authorization after it is signed. 
 
_________________________________  ________________________ 
Signature of Research Participant or   Date 
Research Participant’s Legal Representative* 
 
________________________________  ________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Participant or  Representative’s Relationship 
Research Participant’s Legal Representative*  to Research Participant 
 
*Please explain Representative’s Relationship to Research Participant and include a 
description of Representative’s Authority to act on behalf of Research Participant: 
________________________________________________________________________  
 
________________________________________________________________________
Signature/Printed Name of Person Obtaining Informed Consent                                Date 
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This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We 
believe that they are much more common than has previously been supposed, and that 
most people have had some such experiences during their lives. 
 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or 
wrong answers, and there are no trick questions.  
 
Please note that we are NOT interested in experiences people may have had when under 
the influence of drugs. 
 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS 
For the questions you answer YES to, we are interested in: 
(a) how distressing these beliefs or experiences are 
(b) how often you think about them 
(c) how true you believe them to be.  
Below each question, please circle the number which corresponds most closely to how 
distressing this belief is, how often you think about it, and how much you believe that it 
is true. 
 
Examples: 
 
Do you ever feel as if people are reading your mind? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
 
 
Do you ever feel as if you can read other people’s mind? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
 100 
(1) Do you ever feel as if you are under the control of some force or power other than 
yourself?  NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(2) Do you ever feel as if you are a robot or zombie without a will of your own? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(3) Do you ever feel as if you are possessed by someone or something else? 
 NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(4) Do you ever feel as if your feelings or actions are not under your control? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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 (5) Do you ever feel as if someone or something is playing games with your mind? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(6) Do you ever feel as if people seem to drop hints about you or say things with a double 
meaning?  NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(7) Do you ever feel as if things in magazines or on TV were written especially for you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(8) Do you ever think that everyone is gossiping about you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(9) Do you ever feel as if some people are not what they seem to be? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(10) Do things around you ever feel unreal, as though it was all part of an experiment? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(11) Do you ever feel as if someone is deliberately trying to harm you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(12) Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some way? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(13) Do you ever feel as if there is a conspiracy against you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(14) Do you ever feel as if some organization or institution has it in for you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(15) Do you ever feel, as if someone or something is watching you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(16) Do you ever feel as if you have special abilities or powers? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(17) Do you ever feel as if there is a special purpose or mission to your life? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(18) Do you ever feel as if there is a mysterious power working for the good of the 
world? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(19) Do you ever feel as if you are or destined to be someone very important? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(20) Do you ever feel that you are a very special or unusual person? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(21) Do you ever feel that you are especially close to God? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(22) Do you ever think that people can communicate telepathically? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(23) Do you ever feel as if electrical devices such as computers can influence the way 
you think?  NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(24) Do you ever feel as if there are forces around you which affect you in strange ways? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(25) Do you ever feel as if you have been chosen by God in some way? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(26) Do you believe in the power of witchcraft, voodoo, or the occult? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(27) Are you often worried that your partner may be unfaithful? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(28) Do you ever think that you smell very unusual to other people? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(29) Do you ever feel as if your body is changing in a peculiar way? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(30) Do you ever think that strangers want to have sex with you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(31) Do you ever feel that you have sinned more than the average person? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(32) Do you ever feel that people look at you oddly because of your appearance? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(33) Do you ever feel as if you had no thoughts in your head at all? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(34) Do you ever feel as if your insides might be rotting? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(35) Do you ever feel as if the world is about to end? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(36) Do your thoughts ever feel alien to you in some way? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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(37) Have your thoughts ever been so vivid that you were worried other people would 
hear them?  NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(38) Do you ever feel as if your own thoughts were being echoed back to you? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
 
(39) Do you ever feel as if your thoughts were blocked by someone or something else? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
  
(40) Do you ever feel as if other people can read your mind? 
NO YES ↓ 
 
If YES: 
Not at all        1 
distressing        
                       2                                    3                        4 Very               5  
Distressing 
Hardly ever    1 
think about it 
                       2                       3                       4 Think about   5  
it all the time 
Don’t believe  1 
it’s true 
                       2                       3                       4 Believe it is    5 
absolutely true 
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University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board  
Office of Research & Commercialization 
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501 
Orlando, Florida 32826-3246 
Telephone: 407 823-2901, 407 882-2901 or 407 882-2276 
www.research.ucf.edu/compliance/irb.html 
 
 
Notice of Expedited Initial Review and Approval 
 
From :  UCF Institutional Review Board 
FWA00000351, Exp. 5/07/10, IRB00001138 
 
To : Jeffrey S. Bedwell and Kiminobu Sugaya 
 
Date : February 14, 2008 
 
IRB Number: SBE-08-05420 
 
Study Title: Neurocognitive Functioning in Schizophrenia 
 
Dear Researcher: 
 
Your research protocol noted above was approved by expedited review by the UCF IRB Chair on 
2/14/2008. The expiration date is 2/13/2009. Your study was determined to be minimal risk for human 
subjects and expeditable per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.110. The categories for which this study 
qualifies as expeditable research are as follows: 
 
2. Collection of blood samples by finger stick, heel stick, ear stick, or venipuncture as follows: (a) Subjects 
are healthy, nonpregnant adults who weigh at least 110 pounds; amounts drawn may not exceed 550 ml 
over 8 weeks; and collection may not occur more frequently than 2 times per week. or (b) Subjects are 
other adults and children, considering the age, weight, and health of the subjects the collection procedure; 
the amount of blood to be collected; and the frequency with which it will be collected. For these subjects, 
the amount collected may not exceed the lesser of 50 ml or 3 ml per kg over 8 weeks, and collection may 
not occur more frequently than 2 times per week. 
 
7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on 
perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and 
social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, 
human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
The IRB has approved a consent procedure which requires participants to sign consent forms. Use of 
the approved, stamped consent document(s) is required. Only approved investigators (or other approved 
key study personnel) may solicit consent for research participation. Subjects or their representatives must 
receive a copy of the consent form(s). All data, which may include signed consent form documents, must 
be retained in a locked file cabinet for a minimum of three years (six if HIPAA applies) past the completion 
of this research. Any links to the identification of participants should be maintained on a password-
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protected computer if electronic information is used. Additional requirements may be imposed by your 
funding agency, your department, or other entities. Access to data is limited to authorized individuals listed 
as key study personnel. 
 
To continue this research beyond the expiration date, a Continuing Review Form must be submitted 2 – 4 
weeks prior to the expiration date. Advise the IRB if you receive a subpoena for the release of this 
information, or if a breach of confidentiality occurs. Also report any unanticipated problems or serious 
adverse events (within 5 working days). Do not make changes to the protocol methodology or consent form 
before obtaining IRB approval. Changes can be submitted for IRB review using the 
Addendum/Modification Request Form. An Addendum/Modification Request Form cannot be used to 
extend the approval period of a study. All forms may be completed and submitted online at 
http://iris.research.ucf.edu . 
 
Failure to provide a continuing review report could lead to study suspension, a loss of funding and/or 
publication possibilities, or reporting of noncompliance to sponsors or funding agencies. The IRB 
maintains the authority under 45 CFR 46.110(e) to observe or have a third party observe the consent 
process and the research. 
 
On behalf of Tracy Dietz, Ph.D., UCF IRB Chair, this letter is signed by: 
 
Signature applied by Joanne Muratori on 02/14/2008 04:59:45 PM EST 
 
IRB Coordinator 
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APPENDIX F: FIGURE 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Schizophrenia and Control Group Reaction Times on Neutral 
and Emotional Conditions of the Emotional Stroop Task 
 
 
Schizophrenia group difference: p = 0.04* 
Control group difference: p = 0.28  
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Table 1. Group Differences on Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
 
 
Measure     Schizophrenia group (n = 25)          Control group (n = 25)  
        
Gender (male)a 
 
64% 64% 
Age  
 
39.61 (11.92) 39.57 (11.13) 
Years of education  12.2 (1.8)** 
 
14.2 (1.9)** 
Race: Causcasiana 56% 56% 
Race: African Americana 28% 28% 
Race: Hispanica 4% 8% 
Race: Asiana 4% 0% 
Race: Mixed/Biraciala 8% 8% 
WRAT Standard score  97.92 (10.30) 101.84 (9.42) 
   
PDI Total score  185.48 (113.77)** 52.64 (48.64)** 
 
PDI Yes/No score  
 
15.64 (8.79)** 
 
5.84 (4.62)** 
   
PDI Distress score   52.72 (33.75)** 11.64 (13.29)** 
   
PDI Preoccupation score 52.84 (33.24)** 15.52 (15.14)** 
   
PDI Conviction score 64.28 (41.16)** 19.64 (17.54)** 
   
PANSS Composite score 2.28 (6.76) -- 
   
PANSS Positive score 20.36 (5.20) 
 
-- 
PANSS Negative score 18.08 (4.23) -- 
   
PANSS General score 
 
37.08 (6.91) -- 
PANSS Delusions score 4.04 (1.24) -- 
   
    *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001 
Values represent means and standard deviations for all variables except those notated (a indicates a 
percentage). 
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Table 2. Cognitive Task Performance: Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 
Measure      Schizophrenia group (n = 25)         Control group (n = 25) 
        
E-Stroop RT: Neutral 784.67 (122.43) 690.59 (119.04) 
   
E-Stroop RT: Emotion 824.93 (127.56) 
 
704.65 (159.77) 
E-Stroop RT: Negative words 841.42 (139.91) 808.44 (123.14) 
 
E-Stroop RT: Positive words 
 
714.13 (168.10) 
 
695.17 (153.01) 
   
Word Recall: Neutral 
 
Word Recall: Emotion 
2.72 (1.92) 
 
2.72 (1.67) 
3.88 (1.69) 
 
4.16 (1.57) 
   
Word Recall: Negative words 1.40 (1.12) 2.00 (1.35) 
   
Word Recall: Positive words 1.28 (1.17) 2.16 (1.57) 
JTC: Neutral  6.19 (2.57) 8.57 (1.36) 
JTC: Emotion  
 
5.84 (2.82) 8.34 (1.70) 
Scores for the emotional Stroop (E-Stroop) task indicate reaction time in each condition in milliseconds. 
Scores for the word recall task indicate number words recalled. Scores for the JTC task indicate number of 
trials to reach a decision on that task.     
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Table 3. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results - 
Hypothesis 1 
 
 
Main Effect of Group 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
E-Stroop Taska (1 ,46) 2.91 0.10† 0.06 
Word Recall Taskb (1, 46) 7.28 0.01* 0.14 
JTC Taskc (1, 46) 4.82 0.03* 0.10 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision. 
Hypothesis 1: Participants in the schizophrenia group will perform more poorly on the cognitive tasks (both 
conditions combined within each task) compared to the performance of control group.  
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
 
 
Table 4. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Paired Samples T-tests - 
Hypothesis 2 
 
 
Task & Group 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
t value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (d) 
E-Stroop: Schizophrenia (1, 24) 2.19 0.04* 0.44 
E-Stroop: Control (1, 24) 1.10 0.28 0.22 
Word Recall: Schizophrenia (1, 24) 0.00 1.00 < 0.001 
Word Recall: Control (1, 24) 0.55 0.59 0.11 
JTC Task: Schizophrenia (1, 24) 0.99 0.33 0.20 
JTC Task: Control (1, 24) 0.63 0.53 0.12 
N = 25 
Hypothesis 2: Within each group, there will be a statistically significant emotion effect between task 
conditions for each set of tasks, indicated by a difference in performance on the emotional compared to 
neutral task conditions. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
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Table 5. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results - 
Hypothesis 3 
 
 
Condition X Group Interaction 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
E-Stroop Taska (1 ,46) 0.01 0.93 0.01 
Word Recall Taskb (1, 46) 0.98 0.33 0.02 
JTC Taskc (1, 46) 0.34 0.86 0.001 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision. 
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the schizophrenia group will demonstrate a larger emotion effect (discrepancy 
in performance between emotional and neutral task conditions) compared to the performance of control 
group.  
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
 
 
Table 6. Primary Analyses of Cognitive Task Performance: Mixed ANCOVA Results - 
Hypothesis 4 
 
 
Condition X PDI Interaction 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
E-Stroop Taska (1 ,46) 2.12 0.15 0.04 
Word Recall Taskb (1, 46) 0.95 0.33 0.02 
JTC Taskc (1, 46) 0.62 0.43 0.01 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); covariate = PDI total score; DVa = reaction time; DVb = words recalled; DVc = trials to decision. 
Hypothesis 4: The emotion effect will increase in all participants (regardless of group) as delusion-
proneness (measured by PDI total score) increases. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
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Table 7. Exploratory Analyses of Valence: Mixed ANCOVA Results - Emotional Stroop 
Task 
 
 
Main Effects & Interactions 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
Main Effect of Valence (1 ,46) 7.88 0.007*a 0.15 
Valence X Group Interaction (1, 46) 1.83 0.18 0.04 
Valence X PDI Interaction (1, 46) 0.28 0.64 0.01 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = valence (positive or negative); 
covariate = PDI total score; DV = RT value. 
a = statistically significant main effect of valence indicated that participants performed better in the positive 
(versus negative) condition. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
 
 
 
Table 8. Exploratory Analyses of Valence: Mixed ANCOVA Results - Word Recall Task 
 
 
Main Effects & Interactions 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
Main Effect of Valence (1 ,46) 1.07 0.31 0.02 
Valence X Group Interaction (1, 46) 0.20 0.90 < 0.001 
Valence X PDI Interaction (1, 46) 1.01 0.32 0.02 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = valence (positive or negative); 
covariate = PDI total score; DV = words recalled. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
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Table 9. Exploratory Analyses: Emotional Stroop Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed 
ANCOVA 
 
 
Condition X Subscale Interaction 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
Condition X Distress (1 ,46) 2.55 0.12 0.05 
Group X Condition X Distress (1, 46) 0.08 0.78 0.002 
Condition X Preoccupation (1, 46) 1.54 0.22 0.03 
GroupXConditionXPreoccupation (1, 46) 0.04 0.84 0.001 
Condition X Conviction (1, 46) 1.83 0.18 0.04 
Group X Condition X Conviction (1, 46) 0.02 0.89 < 0.001 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI 
Conviction score. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
 
 
Table 10. Exploratory Analyses: Word Recall Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed 
ANCOVA 
 
 
Condition X Subscale Interaction 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
Condition X Distress (1 ,46) 0.44 0.51 0.009 
Group X Condition X Distress (1, 46) 0.16 0.69 0.003 
Condition X Preoccupation (1, 46) 1.31 0.26 0.03 
GroupXConditionXPreoccupation (1, 46) 0.01 0.91 < 0.001 
Condition X Conviction (1, 46) 1.14 0.30 0.02 
Group X Condition X Conviction (1, 46) < 0.001 0.99 < 0.001 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI 
Conviction score. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
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Table 11. Exploratory Analyses: JTC Task & PDI Dimension Scores Mixed ANCOVA 
Results 
 
 
Condition X Subscale Interaction 
 
Degrees of freedom 
 
F value 
 
p value 
 
Effect size (η2) 
Condition X Distress (1 ,46) 0.20 0.66 0.004 
Group X Condition X Distress (1, 46) 0.38 0.54 0.008 
Condition X Preoccupation (1, 46) 0.34 0.56 0.007 
GroupXConditionXPreoccupation (1, 46) 0.12 0.73 0.003 
Condition X Conviction (1, 46) 0.06 0.80 0.001 
Group X Condition X Conviction (1, 46) 0.005 0.95 < 0.001 
N = 50 
Mixed ANCOVA variables: IV1 = group (schizophrenia or control); IV2 = task condition (emotional or 
neutral); DV = words recalled; covariate = PDI Distress score, or PDI Preoccupation score, or PDI 
Conviction score. 
* p < 0.05 
†statistical trend (p = 0.10) 
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